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1 Introduction		
Global	 demographic	 trends	 imply	 that	more	 people	 are	 living	 in	 areas	 vulnerable	 to	 sudden-onset	
natural	disasters.	Scientists	 forecast	 that	 the	 frequency	and	 intensity	of	 these	disasters	are	 likely	 to	
increase	as	a	result	of	the	effects	of	climate	change.	These	trends,	coupled	with	recent,	high-profile	
mega-disasters,	are	raising	global	awareness	of	the	need	to	build	the	capacity	of	national	governments,	
civil	 society	organisations	and	 international	actors	 to	prevent,	 respond	 to	and	 recover	 from	natural	
disasters	(Ferris	and	Petz,	2013).	There	is	growing	recognition	that	the	theory	and	practice	of	climate	
change	 adaptation	 (CCA)	 and	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 (DRR)	 are	 converging,	 and	 there	 is	 increasing	
interplay	between	the	two	fields	(Solecki	et	al.,	2011).	The	key	aim	of	DRR	is	to	reduce	the	damage	
caused	by	natural	 hazards	 through	 a	 culture	of	 prevention.	As	 such,	DRR	 includes	 the,	 “Systematic	
development	 and	 application	 of	 policies,	 strategies	 and	 practices	 to	 avoid	 (prevention)	 or	 limit	
(mitigation	and	preparedness)	the	adverse	effects	of	hazards”	(UNISDR,	2010a).	DRR	initiatives	have	
the	potential	 to	 reduce	the	negative	 impact	of	hazards	and	would	 lead	to	sustainable	development	
(World	Bank,	2011).	Thus,	it	is	important	to	reduce	and	prevent	the	impact	of	disasters	with	the	proper	
adoption	of	disaster	risk	reduction	strategies.	As	global	climate	change	rises,	the	risk	of	climate	related	
disasters	increases.	According	to	IPCC	(2012),	CCA	is	the,	“Process	of	adjustment	to	actual	or	expected	
climate	and	its	effects,	in	order	to	moderate	harm	or	exploit	beneficial	opportunities.”	As	CCA	also	has	
similar	aims	to	DRR,	it	is	important	that	CCA	and	DRR	communities		work	together	in	addressing	the	
underlying	cause	of	risks.	Accordingly,	there	is	a	need	for	a	systematic	linkage	between	CCA	and	DDR	
to	advance	sustainable	development		((Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010).		
	
Whether	it	is	CCA	or	DRR,	legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	play	a	key	role	in	tackling	their	related	
challenges.	Legal	and	policy	approaches	act	as	the	backbone	for	effective	CCA	and	DRR.	Palliyaguru	et	
al.	 (2010)	 describe	 how	 it	 is	 extremely	 important	 to	 integrate	 DRR	 policies	 into	 the	 development	
process.	 As	 they	 specify,	 risk-management	 policies,	 relevant	 guidelines,	 standards	 and	 legal	
frameworks	should	be	directly	integrated	into		national	level	strategies.	Similarly,	Burton	et	al.	(2006)	
state	that	CCA	must	be	guided	and	supported	by	national	policies	and	strategies	and	for	some	countries,	
these	 in	 turn,	 need	 to	 be	 facilitated	 through	 international	 measures.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 Sendai	
Framework	 for	 DRR	 and	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 for	 Climate	 Change	 have	 become	 important	 global	
agreements.		
	
Accordingly,	this	report	reviews	the	existing	legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	globally.	It	identifies	
the	available	legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	that	address	climate	change	and	natural	hazards,	and	
reviews	the	key	issues	that	prevent	more	effective	integration.	The	findings	of	this	report	are	relevant	
to	global	and	national	decision	makers	who	are	responsible	for	the	development	and	implementation	
of	CCA	and	DRR	strategies.				
1.1 ESPREssO	Project		
This	report	is	an	output	of	the	ESPREssO	project	(Enhancing	Synergies	for	Disaster	Prevention	in	the	
European	Union)	that	aims	to	contribute	to	a	new,	strategic	vision	for	natural	risk	reduction	and	CCA,	
thereby	opening	new	frontiers	for	research	and	policymaking.	To	achieve	this	goal,	the	project	focuses	
on	three	main	challenges:	
• To	 create	 more	 coherent	 national	 and	 European	 approaches	 on	 CCA,	 DRR	 and	 resilience	
strengthening	
• To	enhance	risk	management	capabilities	by	bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	legal/policy	
issues	at	local	and	national	levels	in	six	European	countries	
• To	improve	the	management	of	trans-boundary	disasters	
The	main	final	products	of	ESPREssO	will	be	the	Guidelines	on	Risk	Management	Capability	and	a	Vision	
Paper	on	future	research	strategies	in	order	to	better	define	the	research	priorities	following	the	Sendai	
Framework	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	(SFDRR)	2015–2030.	
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This	synthesis	 report	 is	a	key	deliverable	of	 the	project,	and	 it	 reviews	the	existing	 legal,	policy	and	
science	approaches	globally	in	relation	to	CCA	and	DRR.			
	
This	30	month	project	is	co-ordinated	by	the	AMRA	Centre,	Italy,	with	the	participation	of	six	other	key	
institutions	from	France,	Germany,	Switzerland,	the	UK	and	Denmark.		
	
Further	information	about	the	project	can	be	found	at	www.espressoproject.eu.		
1.2 Horizon	2020	
Horizon	2020	is	the	biggest	EU	Research	and	Innovation	programme	ever,	with	nearly	€80	billion	of	
funding	available	over	seven	years	(2014	to	2020),	in	addition	to	the	private	investment	that	this	money	
will	attract.	It	promises	more	breakthroughs,	discoveries	and	world-firsts	by	taking	great	ideas	from	the	
lab	 to	 the	market.	 Horizon	 2020	 is	 helping	 to	 achieve	 this	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 excellent	 science,	
industrial	leadership	and	tackling	societal	challenges.	The	goal	is	to	ensure	that	Europe	produces	world-
class	science,	removes	barriers	to	innovation	and	makes	it	easier	for	the	public	and	private	sectors	to	
work	together	in	delivering	innovation.	
1.3 Structure	of	the	Report	
The	remainder	of	the	report	is	structured	as	follows:	
	
Section	2	provides	a	synthesis	of	existing	legal/policy	and	science	approaches	in	relation	to	CCA	and	
DRR.	It	addresses	global	and	regional	perspectives.			
	
Section	3	summarises	the	methodology	adopted	in	conducting	this	research.	Sections	4	and	5	identify	
some	of	the	key	issues	and	challenges	associated	with	legal/policy	and	science	approaches	in	CCA	and	
DRR,	including	those	which	may	hinder	more	effective	integration	and	their	ability	to	reduce	disaster	
risk.				
	
Section	6	summarises	and	brings	together	the	main	areas	covered	in	the	report	and	discusses	some	of	
the	emerging	issues.		
	
2 Existing	Legal/Policy	and	Science	Approaches	
Disasters,	either	natural	or	man-made,	cause	widespread	damage	and	losses	around	the	world	every	
year.	Worldwide,	 an	 increased	 intensity	 in	 disasters	 has	 been	observed	over	 the	past	 two	decades	
resulting	 in	 a	 higher	 number	 of	 mortalities,	 economic	 and	 social	 losses.	 In	 particular,	 there	 is	 an	
increasing	exposure	of	economic	assets	in	hazard	prone	areas	which	increases	disaster	risk	(UNISDR,	
2015b).	According	to	new	calculations,	natural	disasters	around	the	globe	have	resulted	in	economic	
losses	 of	 approximately	 $7	 trillion	 since	 1900	 (Amos,	 2016).	 Meeting	 the	 cost	 related	 to	 natural	
disasters	has	increased	from	US$	50	billion	a	year	in	the	1980s	to	US$200	billion	a	year	in	the	last	decade	
(Georgieva,	2014).	As	such,	the	annual	losses	of	disasters	are	staggering.	Over	the	1900-2015	period,	
around	40%	of	economic	losses	were	due	to	flooding,	25%	were	due	to	earthquakes,	20%	were	due	to	
storms,	12%	were	due	to	drought,	2%	to	wildfire,	and	under	1%	to	volcanic	eruptions	(Amos,	2016).	
Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 a	 dramatic	 reduction	 in	 disaster	mortality	 in	 selected	 countries	 and	 regions	
during	the	last	decade	(UNISDR,	2015b).	
	
China,	the	United	States,	India,	the	Philippines	and	Indonesia	together	constitute		the	top	five	countries	
which	have	been	most	frequently	hit	by	natural	disasters	over	the	last	decade	(Guha-Sapir	et	al.,	2016).	
Asia	 accounted	 for	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 disaster	 victims	 (2005-2014	 decade	 average	 of	 80.6%)	
followed	by	Africa,	which	accounted	for	2005-2014	decade	average	of	13.1%.		
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According	to	the	Annual	Disaster	Statistical	Review	2015,	hydrological	disasters	represented	the	largest	
share	 in	 natural	 disaster	 occurrence	 in	 2015	 (46.5%),	 followed	 by	meteorological	 disasters	 (33.8%)	
(Guha-Sapir	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Given	 the	 adverse	 effects	 of	 climate	 change,	 it	 is	 more	 likely	 that	 the	
frequency	 and	 intensity	 of	 hydro-meteorological	 extreme	 events	 have	 increased	 (Dominey-Howes,	
2015).		It	was	evident	that	human	induced	climate	change	had	resulted	in	14	of	28	storms,	droughts	
and	other	2014	extreme	weather	events	investigated	by	global	scientists	(Loftis,	2015).	More	widely,	
climate	change	is	expected	to	 increase	the	 intensity	and	frequency	of	existing	hazards	(World	Bank,	
2015).	In	contrast,	according	to	trends,		geophysical	events	have	remained	stable	(Leaning	and	Guha-
Sapir,	2013).		
	
Over	 the	 last	 decade,	 the	 scale	 and	 impact	 of	 disasters	 have	 increased	 as	 a	 result	 of	 increased	
urbanisation,	deforestation	and	environmental	degradation,	and		intensifying	climate	variables	such	as	
higher	 temperatures,	 extreme	precipitation	 and	more	 violent	wind	 and	water	 storms	 (Leaning	 and	
Guha-Sapir,	2013).	As	 such,	 climate	change	mitigation,	adaptation	and	DRR	have	been	 identified	as	
some	of	the	methods	needed	to	mitigate	the	risks	and	adverse	impacts	of	disasters,	and	to	increase	
society’s	resilience.	
2.1 Key	Global	Policies		
Global	policies	are	needed	to	unify	different	parts	of	the	world.	There	are	three	main	global	policies	
that	 address	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 which	 are	 analysed	 in	 this	 report:	 the	 Sendai	 Framework	 for	 Disaster	
Reduction	 2015-30	 (SFDRR);	 the	 Sustainable	 Development	 Goals	 (SDGs)	 and	 the	 Paris	 Climate	
Agreement.		
2.1.1 Sendai	Framework	for	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	(SFDRR)		
The	SFDRR	was	introduced	at	the	third	United	Nations	World	Conference	on	DRR,	held	in	Sendai,	Japan	
in	2015.		This		provides	a	concise,	focused,	forward-looking	and	action-oriented,	post-2015	framework	
for	DRR.	This	framework	complements	and	replaces	the	Hyogo	Framework	for	Action,	while	identifying	
the	 gaps	 and	 challenges	 to	 be	 further	 addressed.	 As	 an	 action-oriented	 framework,	 it	 can	 be	
implemented	by	governments	and	stakeholders	in	a	complementary	manner.	The	framework	highlights	
the	 importance	of	disaster	governance,	stakeholder	participation	and	disaster	preparedness	against	
future	disasters	(UNISDR,	2015a).	It	further	emphasises	the	impact	of	climate	change	and	its	effects	on	
disasters.	 The	 SFDRR	 focuses	 on	 a	 strategy	 of	 a	 multi-hazard	 approach,	 covering	 disaster	 losses	
between	2015	and	2030.		The	aim	of	the	framework	is	to	achieve	a	substantial	reduction	in	disaster	risk	
and	 losses	 in	 lives,	 livelihoods	 and	 health,	 and	 in	 the	 economic,	 physical,	 social,	 cultural	 and	
environmental	assets	of	persons,	businesses,	communities	and	countries.	This	will	be	achieved	through	
four	priority	areas	(UNISDR,	2015a):	
• Priority	1:	Understanding	disaster	risk	
• Priority	2:	Strengthening	disaster	risk	governance	to	manage	disaster	risk	
• Priority	3:	Investing	in	DRR	for	resilience	
• Priority	4:	Enhancing	disaster	preparedness	for	effective	response	and	to	‘Build	Back	Better’	in	
recovery,	rehabilitation	and	reconstruction		
	
Within	the	aforementioned	priority	areas,	seven	global	targets	have	been	presented:	
• Substantially	reduce	global	disaster	mortality	by	2030,	compared	to	2005-2015	
• Substantially	reduce	the	number	of	affected	people	globally	by	2030,	compared	to	2005-2015	
• Reduce	direct	disaster	economic	loss	by	2030	
• Substantially	reduce	disaster	damage	to	critical	infrastructure	and	disruption	of	basic	services	
(health	and	educational	facilities)	through	improving	resilience	by	2030	
• Substantially	increase	the	number	of	countries	with	national	and	local	DRR	strategies	by	2020	
• Substantially	 enhance	 international	 co-operation	 to	 developing	 countries	 to	 support	 their	
national	actions	by	2030	
• Substantially	increase	the	availability	of,	and	access	to,	multi-hazard,	early	warning	systems	
and	disaster	risk	information	and	assessments	to	the	people	by	2030	
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This	framework	is	applicable	to	both	small-scale	and	large-scale,	frequent	and	infrequent,	sudden	and	
slow-onset,	man-made	or	natural	disasters.	It	highlights	the	importance	of	national	and	federal	state	
governments,	 along	 with	 local	 authorities	 and	 local	 communities,	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources,	
incentives	 and	decision-making	powers.	 The	 framework	emphasises	 the	 importance	of	 the	 science-
policy	 interface	 through	 dialogues	 and	 co-operation	 	 among	 scientific	 communities,	 other	 relevant	
stakeholders	and	policymakers.	They	propose	to	clearly	define	roles	and	responsibilities	of	both	the	
private	 and	 public	 sectors	 through	 providing	 incentives,	 enhancing	 disaster	 risk	 transparency	 and	
establishing	proper	organisational	structures.		 	
2.1.2 Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)	
The	SDGs,	otherwise	known	as	the	Global	Goals,	are	a	universal	call	to	action	to	end	poverty,	protect	
the	planet	and	ensure	that	all	people	enjoy	peace	and	prosperity.	These	17	Goals	build	on	the	successes	
of	the	Millennium	Development	Goals,	while	 including	new	areas	such	as	climate	change,	economic	
inequality,	 innovation,	 sustainable	 consumption,	peace	and	 justice,	 among	 the	other	priorities.	 The	
goals	are	 interconnected,	often	the	key	to	success;	 	one	will	 involve	tackling	 issues	more	commonly	
associated	with	another.	The	goals	and	targets	became	effective	on	1st	January,	2016	for	a	15	year	time	
period	(UNDP,	2016).		
	
The	17	goals	emphasise	the	importance	of	having	a	global	partnership	for	successful	implementation.	
This	 partnership	 will	 benefit	 the	 poorest	 and	 most	 vulnerable	 societies	 by	 bringing	 together	
governments,	 the	 private	 sector,	 civil	 society,	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 other	 relevant	 actors	 with	
available	 resources.	 In	 addition,	 they	 promote	 the	 mainstreaming	 of	 gender	 perspectives	 in	 the	
implementation	of	the	agenda.	This	is	to	ensure	gender	equity	and	empowerment	of	women	and	girls	
as	an	important	element	towards	achieving	goals	and	targets.		
	
The	 role	 of	 public	 finance	 is	 also	 emphasised	 by	 the	 agenda	 for	 mobilisation	 of	 public	 resources	
domestically.	This	 includes	the	developed	countries’	official	provision	of	0.7%	of	their	gross	national	
income	for	official	development	assistance	(ODA)	to	developing	countries,	and	0.15%	-	0.2%	of	ODA	to	
the	least	developed	countries.	The	agreement	highlights	the	importance	of	national	parliaments	(for	
legislative	and	budgetary	allocations)	and	their	roles	of	accountability	for	effective	implementation.		
	
Climate	Action	is	the	13th	development	goal.	The	goal	aims	to	mobilise	$100	billion	annually	by	2020	to	
address	the	needs	of	developing	countries	and	help	to	mitigate	climate-related	disasters.	It	aims	to	help	
more	vulnerable	regions,	such	as	land	locked	countries	and	island	states,	to	adapt	to	climate	change.	
This	goal	suggests		integrating	disaster	risk	measures	into	national	strategies	(UNDP,	2016).	Similarly,	
the	13th	goal	proposes	to	strengthen	resilience	and	adaptive	capacity	to	climate	related	hazards	and	
disasters	in	all	countries.	More	importantly,	they	propose	to	integrate	climate	change	measures	into	
national	policies,	strategies	and	planning.	The	need	to	enhance	human	and	institutional	capacity	on	
climate	change	mitigation,	adaptation,	 impact	reduction	and	early	warning	are	all	highlighted	in	the	
goal.	They	further	aim	at	enhancing	capacities	among	the	least	developed	countries	and	small	island	
developing	 countries	 with	 more	 focus	 on	 women,	 youth	 and	 local	 and	 marginalised	 communities	
towards	 effective	 climate	management.	 The	 goal	 emphasises	 the	 support	 of	 international	 financial	
institutions	 for	 developing	 countries.	 In	 addition,	 they	 recommit	 to	 enhancing	 the	 voice	 and	
participation	 of	 developing	 countries	 in	 international,	 economic	 decision-making,	 norm-setting	 and	
global,	economic	governance.		
	
Goal	11	deals	with	sustainable	cities	and	communities.	This	is	to	ensure	cities	and	human	settlements	
are	safe,	resilient	and	sustainable.	Accordingly,	this	goal	aims	to	overcome	the	challenges	faced	by	cities	
and	 to	 support	 them	 to	 continue	 thriving	and	growing,	while	 improving	 resource	use	 and	 reducing	
pollution	and	poverty.	 It	 focuses	on	areas	 such	as	adequate,	 safe	and	affordable	housing	and	basic	
services,	 sustainable	 transport	 systems,	 inclusive	 and	 sustainable	 urbanization,	 participatory,	
integrated	 and	 sustainable	 human	 settlement	 planning,	 inclusive	 and	 accessible	 green	 and	 public	
spaces	and	cultural	and	natural	heritage.	It	also	emphasises	the	importance	of	reducing	the	economic	
losses	of	disasters,	including	water-related	disasters,	with	a	focus	on	protecting	the	poor		in	vulnerable	
situations.	 It	 further	 aims	 to	 reduce	 the	 environmental	 impact	 of	 cities	 and	 improve	 social	 and	
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environmental	links	between	urban,	peri-urban	and	rural	areas	by	strengthening	national	and	regional	
development	planning.		
	
The	 framework	 of	 Global	 Partnership	 for	 Sustainable	 Development	 is	 proposed	 as	 the	 way	 of	
implementing	the	SDGs	with	the	support	of	policies	and	actions	outlined	 in	the	Addis	Ababa	Action	
Agenda	which	set	out	a	global,	financing	framework	for	the	post-2015	development	agenda.	This	is	an	
integral	part	of	the	2030	Agenda	for	Sustainable	Development.	It	deals	with	domestic	public	resources,	
domestic	and	 international	private	business	and	finance,	an	 international	development	corporation,	
international	trade,	debt,	addressing	systematic	issues	of	science,	technology,	innovation	and	capacity	
building,	data,	monitoring	and	follow-up.	
2.1.3 Paris	Agreement			
At	 the	Paris	Climate	Conference	 in	December	2015,	195	countries	adopted	 the	 first	ever,	universal,	
legally	binding,	 global	 climate	deal.	 This	 agreement	operates	within	 the	United	Nations	 Framework	
Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC).	This	was	signed	by	197	UNFCCC	members	and	ratified	by	126	
members	as	of	December	2016.	The	Paris	Agreement	will	come	into	force	on	the	30th	day	after	the	date	
on	which	at	least	55	parties	to	the	Convention	[accounting	in	total	for	at	least	an	estimated	55%	of	the	
total	 global	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 (GHG)]	 have	 deposited	 their	 instruments	 of	 ratification,	
acceptance,	approval	or	accession	with	the	depositary.	The	first	of	these	thresholds	was	achieved	on	
22nd		September,	2016.	
	
According	to		Article	2	of	the	Agreement,	its	objectives	are:	
• To	maintain	global	average	temperatures	to	below	20C	when	compared	to	pre-industrial	levels	
and	to	limit	the	temperature	rises	to	1.50C	above	pre-industrial	levels		
• To	 increase	 the	 ability	 of	 adaptation	 to	 climate	 change,	 to	 improve	 climate	 resilience	 and	
reduce	GHG	emissions	without	any	threats	to	food	production	
• Make	available	financial	sources	for	low	GHG	emissions	and	climate	resilient	development	
	
One	 of	 the	 main	 features	 of	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 is	 its	 ‘bottom	 up’	 structure.	 	 As	 it	 emphasises	
consensus	building	among	members,	 it	accepts	voluntary	and	nationally	determined	targets.	Hence,	
their	climate	goals	are	politically	supported	rather	than	legislative	requirements.	This	agreement	makes	
all	parties		submit	to	emission	reduction	plans.	Their	plans	are	based	on	the	principle	of	‘Common	but	
Differentiated	Responsibility’	due	to	differences	between	capacities	and	duties	to	climate	action	among	
nations.	Further,	there	is	no	specific	treatment	between	developed	and	developing	nations.		
	
According	to	Article	3	of	the	Agreement,	the	contribution	of	each	member	should	be	set	individually	by	
considering	the	principle	of	ambition,	represent	a	progression	over	time	and	with	a	view	to	achieve	the	
ultimate	purpose	of	the	Agreement.	These	are	known	as	‘Nationally	Determined	Contributions’.		
	
The	 Agreement	 contains	 collective,	 long-term	 adaptation	 goals.	 According	 to	 Article	 7	 of	 the	
Agreement,	 parties	 establish	 the	 global	 goal	 on	 adaptation	 towards	 enhancing	 adaptive	 capacity,	
strengthening	resilience	and	reducing	vulnerability.	They	identify	adaptation	as	a	global	challenge	and	
developing	 countries	 require	 immediate	 actions	 since	 they	 are	more	 vulnerable	 to	 climate	 change.		
Similarly,	 the	 adaptation	 actions	 should	 be	 country	 driven,	 gender	 responsive,	 participatory	 and	
transparent	approaches,	based	on	available	scientific	knowledge,	traditional	knowledge,	knowledge	of	
indigenous	people	and	 local	knowledge	when	 integrating	adaptation	 into	other	policies	and	actions	
(UNFCCC,	2015	).	
2.1.4 Role	of	the	Global	Policy	Frameworks	in	integrating	CCA	and	DRR	and	
facilitating	trans-boundary	Crisis	Management			
2.1.4.1 Integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	
The	SFDRR	is	a	15-year,	non-binding	agreement,	which	advocates	the	state’s	role	of	reducing	disaster	
risk	while	sharing	the	responsibility	with	other	stakeholders	 including	 local	government,	 the	private	
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sector	 and	 others.	 	 The	 Framework	 aims	 to	 substantially	 reduce	 disaster	 risk	 and	 losses	 in	 lives,	
livelihoods	 and	 health	 and	 in	 the	 economic,	 physical,	 social,	 cultural	 and	 environmental	 assets	 of	
persons,	businesses,	communities	and	countries	(UNISDR,	2015a).	It	recognises	that	many	disasters	are	
exacerbated	 by	 climate	 change	 and	 calls	 for	 dedicated	 action	 focusing	 on	 underlying	 disaster	 risk	
drivers	such	as	climate	change	and	variability.	Climate	change	is	considered	as	one	of	the	drivers	of	
disaster	risk	and	the	framework	recognises	the	importance	of	respecting	the	mandate	of	the	United	
Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change.	 It	 calls	 for	 coherence	 between	 development,	
strengthening	and	implementation	of	relevant	policies,	plans,	practices	and	mechanisms	across	climate	
change	and	variability.	It	also	recognises	that	effective	DRR	contributes	to	sustainable	development.	
While	recognising	that	disasters	undermine	the	efforts	to	achieve	sustainable	development,	it	recalled	
the	outcome	document	of	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development,	held	in	2012,	
which	called	for	a	renewed	sense	of	urgency	in	the	context	of	sustainable	development	to	be	integrated	
at	 all	 levels.	 The	 Framework	 calls	 for	 coherence	 between	 development,	 strengthening	 and	
implementation	of	relevant	policies,	plans,	practices	and	mechanisms	across	sustainable	development	
and	growth.			
	
The	new	SDGs,	which	were	adopted	on	25th	September	2015,	consist	of	a	set	of	goals	to	end	poverty,	
protect	 the	planet	and	ensure	prosperity	 for	all.	 For	 the	goals	 to	be	 reached	 in	 the	15	year	period,		
everyone	must	do	their	part	 including	government,	 the	private	sector,	civil	 society	and	people	 (UN,	
2015).	Of	the	17	goals,	some		are	specifically	linked	to	disaster	risk	reduction	and	climate	change.	For		
example,	 goal	 no.	 11,	 ‘Sustainable	 Cities	 and	 Communities’,	 is	 specifically	 linked	 with	 disaster	 risk	
reduction.	It	aims	to	make	cities	inclusive,	safe,	resilient	and	sustainable.	This	goal	has	specific	reference	
to	SFDRR	and	highlights	the	 importance	of	holistic	disaster	risk	management	 in	 line	with	the	Sendai	
Framework	 for	 Disaster	 Risk	 Reduction.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 SDGs	 have	 tried	 to	 create	 some	
coherence	between	the	sustainable	development	agenda	and	the	Sendai	Framework.	
	
Similarly,	 there	 is	 a	 specific	 goal	 for	 climate	 action,	 which	 aims	 to	 combat	 climate	 change	 and	 its	
impacts.	It	recognises	the	Paris	Agreement	and	that	all	countries	agreed	to	work	together	to	limit	global	
temperature	rises	to	well	below	2	degrees	Celsius,	above	pre-industrial	levels,	and	to	pursue	efforts	to	
limit	the	temperature	increase	even	further	to	1.5	degrees	Celsius	(UNFCCC,	2015).	The	SDGs	recognise	
the	importance	of	implementing	the	Paris	Agreement	for	the	achievement	of	the	SDGs	and	provide	a	
roadmap	 for	 climate	 actions	 that	 will	 reduce	 emissions	 and	 build	 climate	 resilience	 (UN,	 2015).	
Similarly,	the	Paris	Agreement	has	a	number	of	references	to	sustainable	development.	It	has	tried	to	
look	at	 climate	change	 in	 the	context	of	 sustainable	development	and	 tries	 to	promote	sustainable	
development	 and	 environmental	 integrity.	 However,	 within	 the	 agreement,	 there	 is	 no	 specific	
reference	to	SFDRR	and	SDGs.		
2.1.4.2 Trans-boundary	Crisis	Management	
Across	 	global	policies,	a	high	prominence	has	been	given	to	trans-boundary	co-operation	and	crisis	
management.		
	
The	SFDRR	recognises	the	pivotal	role	of	international,	regional,	subregional	and	trans-boundary	co-
operation	in	supporting	the	efforts	of	states,	their	national	and	local	authorities,	as	well	as	communities	
and	businesses,	to	reduce	disaster	risk.	It	highlights	that	each	state	has	the	primary	responsibility	to	
prevent	and	reduce	disaster	risk,	including	through	international,	regional,	subregional,	trans-boundary	
and	 bilateral	 co-operation.	 It	 guides	 actions	 at	 national	 and	 local	 levels,	 as	 well	 as	 regional	 and	
international	levels,	in	order	to	foster	more	efficient	planning,	create	common	information	systems	and	
exchange	good	practices	and	programmes	for	co-operation	and	capacity	development,	in	particular,	to	
address	 common	and	 trans-boundary	 disaster	 risks.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 Framework	 recognises	 the	 trans-
boundary	nature	of	disaster	risk	and	guides	action	at	the	regional	level	through	agreed	regional	and	
subregional	strategies	and	mechanisms	for	co-operation.	Moreover,	the	importance	of	trans-boundary	
co-operation	 is	 also	 recognised	 in	 relation	 to	 ecosystem-based	 approaches	 with	 regard	 to	 shared	
resources,	to	build	resilience	and	reduce	disaster	risk,	including	epidemic	and	displacement	risk,	and	
the	Framework	highlights	the	importance	of	promoting	trans-	boundary	co-operation	to	enable	policy	
and	planning	for	the	implementation.	
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Similarly,	the	Paris	Agreement	advocates	global	and	regional	co-operation	and	views	climate	change	
and	adaptation	in	a	global	dimension.	It	brings	all	nations	to	a	common	cause	to	combat	climate	change	
and	adapt	 to	 its	effects,	with	enhanced	support	 to	assist	developing	countries	 (UNFCCC,	2015).	The	
Agreement	recognises	adaptation	as	a	global	challenge	with	local,	subnational,	national,	regional	and	
international	 dimensions,	 and	 a	 special	 emphasis	 has	 been	 given	 to	 enhancing	 the	 capacities	 of	
developing	 countries	 to	 implement	 this,	 including	 through	 regional,	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	
approaches.	Likewise,	the	SDGs	have	a	dedicated	goal	to	revitalise	global	partnerships	for	sustainable	
development	which	recognise	the	trans-boundary	nature	of	the	problem	and	the	importance	of	trans-
boundary	co-operation.	Accordingly,	this	goal	highlights	the	essential	role	of		partnerships	at	the	global,	
regional,	 national	 and	 local	 level.	 Hence,	 it	 will	 enhance	 the	 global	 partnership	 for	 sustainable	
development,	complemented	by	multi-stakeholder	partnerships	that	mobilize	and	share	knowledge,	
expertise,	technology	and	financial	resources,	to	support	the	achievement	of	the	SDGs	in	all	countries,	
and	in	particular,	developing	countries	(UN,	2015). 
2.1.4.3 Coherence	Across	Policies	
These	 global	 policy	 frameworks	 have	 created	 a	 significant	 opportunity	 to	 build	 coherence	 across	
overlapping	policy	areas	(Murray	et	al.,	2016).	It	is	expected	that	these	global	agreements	will	provide	
a	foundation	for	a	shared	aim	of	making	development	sustainable,	resilient	and	safe	(Wahlström,	2015).	
However,	a	large	number	of	agreements	has	created	challenges,	especially	in	terms	of	implementation	
and	monitoring.	As	 such,	 how	 the	policy	 commitments	 are	put	 into	practice	 is	 less	 straightforward	
(Carnwath,	2016).	According	to	(Kelman,	2015),	whilst	they	are	trying	to	connect	and	follow	each	other	
closely,	they	are	not	coming	together	fully.	For	example,	the	SFDRR	lacks	an	appropriate	framing	of	
climate	change.	Although	climate	change	has	been	identified	as	one	of	the	risk	drivers,	it	has	not	been	
given		adequate	prominence.	The	primary	focus	was		on	tackling	root	causes	of	disaster	risks,	such	as		
vulnerability,	which	undermines	climate	change.		
	
In	order	to	achieve	the	goals	of	the	global	agreements	it	is	important	that	we	integrate	them.	According	
to	(Velasquez,	2017),	working	in	separation	prevents	a	holistic	perspective	and	can	lead	to	resource	
problems.	Murray	et	al.	(2016)	emphasise	that	none	of	the	frameworks	engage	with	a	full	range	of	risk	
drivers.	 They	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 systematic	 view	 of	 risks	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 frameworks	
together.	Therefore,	there	is	the	potential	to	design	finance	mechanisms,	policies	and	programmes	that	
can	 deliver	 more	 than	 one	 set	 of	 frameworks	 (Peters	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 This	 will	 help	 to	 achieve	 the	
objectives	of	the	frameworks	effectively,	efficiently	and	sustainably.	
	
Murray	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 identifying	 the	 synergies	 between	 policies,	
programmes	and	 institutions	 in	order	to	align	the	actions.	They	propose	seven	recommendations	 in	
building	 coherence	 between	 the	 agreements	 and	 global	 agendas.	 These	 recommendations	 include:	
raising	awareness	on	how	the	different	frameworks	align,	facilitating	key	partnerships	to	work	across	
agreements,	 instituting	 clear	 governance	 arrangements	 for	 collective	 action	 and	 accountability,	
developing	 consistent	 definitions,	 promoting	 science	 and	 technology	 involvement,	 joined	 up	
monitoring	 processes	 and	 ensuring	 national	 ownership	 and	 leadership	 on	 all	 the	 frameworks.	
Moreover,	a	successful	DRR	depends	on	better	use	of	science	and	technology	and	the	way	in	which	
science	 and	 technology	 can	 provide	 evidence	 for	 policy.	 According	 to	 (Carabine,	 2015),	 science	 is	
included	as	a	core	element	of	the	SFDRR.	However,	implementation	in	practice	is	still	unclear.	
	
2.2 Other	Global	and	Regional	Policies:	Examples					
2.2.1 Addis	Ababa	Action	Agenda				
 
In	July	2015,	the	Heads	of	State	and	Government	with	delegates	gathered	in	Addis	Ababa	to	set	a	global	
framework	for	financing	development,	post-2015.	Their	tasks	aimed:	1.	To	follow	up	on	commitments	
and	 assess	 the	 progress	 made	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Monterrey	 Consensus	 and	 the	 Doha	
Declaration;	 2.	 To	 further	 strengthen	 the	 framework	 to	 finance	 sustainable	 development	 and	 the	
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means	of	 implementation	 for	 the	universal,	post-2015	development	agenda;	3.	To	 reinvigorate	and	
strengthen	the	financing	for	the	development	follow-up	process	to	ensure	that	the	actions	to	which	
they	 commit	 are	 implemented	 and	 reviewed	 in	 an	 appropriate,	 inclusive,	 timely	 and	 transparent	
manner.	Having	understood	the	challenges	of	environmental	degradation	and	climate	change,	along	
with	unmet	monetary	agendas,	specifically	among	developing	countries,	the	importance	of	the	lack	of	
financing	for	achieving	sustainable	development	goals	are	emphasized.		The	agenda	aims	to	support	
national	 and	 local	 capacities	 for	 prevention,	 adaptation	 and	mitigation	 of	 external	 shocks	 and	 risk	
management.		
	
Furthermore,	they	commit	to	strengthening	investments	of	national	and	local	actors	to	manage	and	
finance	disaster	risk,	as	part	of	sustainable	development	strategies	to	get	international	assistance	at	
the		necessary	time.	They	highlight		a	recommitment	of	0.7%	of	gross	national	 income	to	aid	by	the	
developing	countries.		
 
2.2.2 SDG	Climate	Nexus	Facility	(Ali,	2017)	
 
In	order	to	 integrate	CCA-DRR	approaches,	a	new	SDG	Climate	Nexus	Facility	was	 introduced	 in	the	
Arab	region.	This	is	a	regional	initiative	between	the	League	of	Arab	States,	the	Arab	Water	Council,	
UNDP,	 UNEP,	 UNISDR	 and	 WFP,	 to	 help	 countries	 integrate	 disaster	 and	 climate	 resilience	 into	
development	 and	 humanitarian	 interventions	 (Ali,	 2017).	 Enhancing	 the	 capacities	 of	 taking	 an	
integrated	 approach	will	 help	 achieve	 the	 global	 agreements	 –	 the	 SFDRR,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 to	
Combat	Climate	Change	and	the	SDGs	-	in	a	more	integrated	manner.	
	
The	aim	of	the	initiative	is	to	develop	local	capacities	for	risk-informed	development	through	integrated	
CCA-DRR	approaches	and	to	bring	greater	coherence	 in	 implementation	of	 the	Arab	Action	Plan	on	
Climate	Change	and	the	Arab	DRR	Strategy	(Ali,	2017).	Accordingly,	it	is	expected	that	this	initiative	will	
enhance	the	use	of	science	for	decision-making	and	expand	early	warning	systems	and	social	protection	
mechanisms,	and	enhance	the	resilience	of	agriculture	and	water	systems	to	more	severe	droughts	and	
floods.	
	
This	 new	 initiative	will	 bring	 together	 the	UN’s	 leading	development	 and	humanitarian	 agencies	 to	
promote	an	integrated	approach	to	adaptation	as	a	means	to:		
• Protect	the	capacities	and	assets	from	impacts	of	climatic	disasters	
• Prepare	communities	and	institutions	to	cope	with	and	mitigate	the	impacts	of	climatic	shocks	
and	disasters	
• Strengthen	 communities’	 ability	 to	 recover	 and	 reconstruct	 from	 conflicts	 in	 a	 way	 that	
ensures	their	resilience	to	future	climatic	disasters	(Ali,	2017)	
	
2.2.3 New	Urban	Agenda	(HABITAT	3)	
 
The	New	Urban	Agenda	 is	 the	outcome	document	agreed	upon	at	the	Habitat	3	conference	held	 in	
Quito,	 Ecuador	 in	 October	 2016.	 This	 begins	 with	 the	 Quito	 Declaration	 on	 Sustainable	 Cities	 and	
Human	Settlements	for	All.	The	New	Urban	Agenda	guides	the	initiatives	around	urbanization	for	the	
next	 20	 years	 with	 a	 range	 of	 key	 actors:	 nation	 states,	 city	 and	 regional	 leaders,	 international	
development	funders,	UN	programmes	and	civil	society	(Citiscope,	2015).	Accordingly,	it	is	expected	to	
address	 both	 the	 challenges	 and	 opportunities	 of	 urbanization	 through	 planning,	 design,	 finance,	
development,	governance	and	management,		guided	by	the	New	Urban	Agenda.	
	
The	New	Urban	Agenda	has	taken	full	account	of	the	global	agreements	made	in	the	course	of	the	year	
2015,	 in	 particular,	 the	 2030	 Agenda	 for	 Sustainable	 Development,	 including	 the	 Sustainable	
Development	Goals	(SDGs),	and	the	Addis	Ababa	Action	Agenda	of	the	Third	International	Conference	
on	Financing	 for	Development,	 the	Paris	Agreement	adopted	under	 the	United	Nations	Framework	
Convention	on	Climate	Change	 (UNFCCC),	 the	 Sendai	 Framework	 for	Disaster	 Risk	Reduction	2015-
2030,	the	Vienna	Programme	of	Action	for	Landlocked	Developing	Countries	for	the	Decade	2014-2024,	
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the	Small	Island	Developing	States	Accelerated	Modalities	of	Action	(SAMOA)	Pathway	and	the	Istanbul	
Programme	of	Action	for	the	Least	Developed	Countries	for	the	Decade	2011-2020.	The	New	Urban	
Agenda	also	 included	 the	Rio	Declaration	on	Environment	and	Development,	 the	World	Summit	on	
Sustainable	Development,	the	World	Summit	for	Social	Development,	the	International	Conference	on	
Population	and	Development	Programme	of	Action,	 the	Beijing	Platform	for	Action,	and	 the	United	
Nations	Conference	on	Sustainable	Development,	and	the	follow	up	to	these	conferences	(Habitat	3,	
2016).		
	
Accordingly,	the	New	Urban	Agenda	has	tried	to	integrate	disaster	risk	reduction	and	climate	change	
adaptation	into	age-	and	gender-responsive	urban	and	territorial	development	and	planning	processes.	
This	 includes	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	 resilience-based	 and	 climate-effective	 design	 of	 spaces,	
buildings	and	 constructions,	 services	and	 infrastructure	and	nature-based	 solutions.	 It	 also	 includes	
promoting	 co-operation	 and	 co-ordination	 across	 sectors,	 as	 well	 as	 building	 the	 capacity	 of	 local	
authorities	 to	 develop	 and	 implement	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 and	 response	 plans	 and	 formulate	
adequate	contingency	and	evacuation	procedures	(Habitat	3,	2016).		
	
It	 envisages	 cities	 and	 human	 settlements	 that	 adopt	 and	 implement	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 and	
management,	 reduce	 vulnerability,	 build	 resilience	 and	 responsiveness	 to	 natural	 and	 man-made	
hazards	 and	 foster	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 to	 climate	 change.	 It	 also	 advocates	 environmental	
sustainability	 by	 promoting	 clean	 energy	 and	 sustainable	 use	 of	 land	 and	 resources	 in	 urban	
development	as	well	as	protecting	ecosystems	and	biodiversity,	including	adopting	healthy	lifestyles	in	
harmony	with	nature,	 promoting	 sustainable	 consumption	 and	production	patterns,	 building	urban	
resilience,	reducing	disaster	risks	and	mitigating	and	adapting	to	climate	change	(Habitat	3,	2016).		
	
2.2.4 Ten	Essentials	for	Making	Cities	Resilient	
 
The	 ‘Making	 Cities	 Resilient’	 campaign	 was	 launched	 in	 May,	 2010	 to	 address	 the	 issues	 of	 local	
governance	and	urban	risk.	The	campaign	was	initiated	to	support	the	implementation	of	the	Hyogo	
Framework	for	Action	(HFA)	at	local	level.	Building	on	the	Sendai	Framework,	the	second	phase	of	the	
campaign	started	 in	2016	and	will	 shift	 its	 focus	to	 implementation	support,	partners’	engagement,	
investment	 co-operation	 opportunities,	 local	 action	 planning	 and	 monitoring	 of	 progress	 and	 it	 is	
expected	to	carry	on	at	least	until	2020	(UNISDR,	2015b).	The	campaign	is	led	by	the	UNISDR.	However,	
it	 is	 	 self-motivating,	partnership	and	city-driven,	with	 the	aim	 to	 raise	 the	profile	of	 resilience	and	
disaster	risk	reduction	among	local	governments	and	urban	communities	worldwide	(UNISDR,	2015b).	
	
The	campaign	has	developed	ten	 ‘Essentials’	 to	enable	 local	governments	to	make	their	cities	more	
disaster	resilient	and	they	are	listed	below:		
• Essential	1:	Organise	for	disaster	resilience		
• Essential	2:	Identify,	understand	and	use	current	and	future	risk	scenarios		
• Essential	3:	Strengthen	financial	capacity	for	resilience		
• Essential	4:	Pursue	resilient	urban	development	and	design		
• Essential	5:	Safeguard	natural	buffers	to	enhance	ecosystems’	protective	functions	
• Essential	6:	Strengthen	institutional	capacity	for	resilience		
• Essential	7:	Understand	and	strengthen	societal	capacity	for	resilience		
• Essential	8:	Increase	infrastructure	resilience		
• Essential	9:	Ensure	effective	disaster	response		
• Essential	10:	Expedite	recovery	and	build	back	better		
(UNISDR,	2015b)	
	
Some	of	the	Essentials	have	clearly	acknowledged	the	climate	change	impacts	and	the	10	Essentials	
have	 tried	 to	 incorporate	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 	 to	 some	 extent.	 For	 	 example,	 Essential	 1	 highlights	 the	
importance	 of	 engaging	 and	 learning	 from	 other	 city	 networks	 and	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 city-to-city	
learning	 programmes,	 promoting	 climate	 change	 and	 resilience	 initiatives.	 Similarly,	 Essential	 2	
considers	how	hazards	might	change	over	time,	given	the	impact	of	factors	such	as	urbanization	and	
climate	change.	Likewise,	Essential	5	highlights	the	 importance	of	anticipating	changes	from	climate	
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trends,	 urbanization	 and	 planning,	 to	 enable	 ecosystem	 services	 to	 withstand	 these.	 Essential	 6	
specifically	highlights	the	importance	of	integrating	disaster	and	climate	risk	considerations	in	project	
evaluation	and	design.		
	
2.2.5 Framework	for	Resilient	Development	in	the	Pacific:	An	Integrated	
Approach	to	Address	Climate	Change	and	Disaster	Risk	Management	
(FRDP)	2017–2030	(SPC	et	al.,	2016)	
 
At	 the	Pacific	 Island	Forum	Leaders’	meeting	 in	2012,	 it	was	agreed	 to	develop	a	 single,	 integrated	
regional	 framework	on	climate	change	and	disaster	 risk	management,	 to	 succeed	 the	 two	separate	
regional	frameworks	on	climate	change	and	disaster	risk	management	after	their	expiry	in	2015	(SPC	
et	al.,	2016).	This	decision	was	operationalized	by	a	roadmap	document,	outlining	the	process	for	the	
development	of	this	new	framework.	The	substantive	work	on	the	formulation	of	the	new	framework	
was	initiated	after	the	first	Joint	Meeting	of	the	Pacific	Climate	Change	Roundtable	and	Pacific	Platform	
for	Disaster	Risk	Management	in	2013.		The	FRDP	was	developed,	firstly,	on	the	basis	of	reviews	of	the	
two	previous	regional	frameworks,	so	that	it	incorporates	lessons	learned	from	their	implementation.	
Secondly,	the	document	was	developed	through	an	extensive	and	inclusive	engagement	process	with	
stakeholders,	from	national	and	communities	to	regional	and	international	levels	(SPC	et	al.,	2016).	
 
3 Research	Methodology	
The	aim	of	this	study	was	to	review	the	existing,	legal/policy	and	science	approaches	in	relation	to	the	
three	ESPREssO	challenges	as	described	in		Section	1.3:	
• To	 create	 more	 coherent	 national	 and	 European	 approaches	 on	 CCA,	 DRR	 and	 resilience	
strengthening	
• To	enhance	risk	management	capabilities	by	bridging	the	gap	between	science	and	legal/policy	
issues	at	local	and	national	levels	in	six	European	countries	
• To	improve	the	management	of	trans-boundary	disasters	
At	the	initial	stage,	a	literature	review	was	conducted	to	identify	the	key	challenges	and	gaps	related	
to	the	three	key	ESPREssO	challenges.	Thereafter,	based	on	the	initial	findings,	a	conceptual	framework	
was	developed	which	is	depicted	in	Figure	1.	This	led	to	identifying	the	key	themes	for	the	study.	Once	
the	 key	 themes	 were	 finalised,	 the	 data	 collection	 instruments	 and	 the	 reporting	 template	 were	
developed.	
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Figure	1-	Espresso	conceptual	framework		
The	 key	 data	 collection	 instruments	 are	 the	 desk-based	 literature	 review,	 semi-structured	 expert	
interviews	and	a	questionnaire	survey.	The	desk-based	study	had	two	purposes;	one	was	to	identify	
the	 legal/policy	 and	 science	 approaches.	 Secondly,	 the	 desk-based	 literature	 review	 identified	 the	
existing	issues	and	critically	reviewed	the	legal,	policy	and	science	approaches.	A	desk-based	literature	
review	was	the	ideal	data	collection	method	to	initiate	the	study.		
	
After	completing	the	desk-based	 literature	review,	the	research	team	conducted	a	number	of	semi-
structured,	expert	 interviews	and	 focus	group	expert	discussions	 to	 identify	 the	key	challenges	and	
issues	 in	the	existing	 legal/policy	and	science	approaches	from	a	global	perspective.	Accordingly,	10	
interviews	were	conducted	with	disaster	resilience	and	climate	change	adaptation	experts	across	the	
globe,	mainly	 covering	 regions	 and	 countries	 such	 as	 Asia,	 Africa,	 USA,	 Canada	 and	 Australia.	 The	
sample	represented	academics,	practitioners,	NGOs,	representatives	from	government	bodies	and	so	
forth.		In	addition	to	semi-structured	expert	interviews,	the	research	team	also	conducted	three	focus	
group	discussions	with	five	to	six	participants	in	each.	Once	the	data	was	collected,	it	was	qualitatively	
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analysed	by	using	QSR-NVivO	version	11	and	thereafter,	based	on	the	identified	key	themes,	mind	maps	
were	developed	to	understand	the	context	for	each	and	every	issue	and	to	identify	the	influence	of	the	
existing	legal/policy	and	science	approaches.		
	
Finally,	 to	gain	a	wider	perspective	on	the	key	challenges	and	 issues	 in	 the	existing	 legal/policy	and	
science	approaches	from	a	global	perspective,	an	online	questionnaire	was	developed.	The	survey	was	
mainly	designed	to	rate	answers	on	a	Likert	scale,	which	allows	participants	to	specify	their	 level	of	
agreement	 on	 a	 five-point	 	 scale,	 1	 being	 ‘strongly	 disagree’	 and	 5	 being	 ‘strongly	 agree’.	 The	
questionnaire	 was	 filled	 out	 by	 140	 highly	 experienced	 disaster	 resilience	 and	 climate	 change	
adaptation	 experts	 across	 the	 globe	 representing	 academia	 and	 research,	 national	 and	 central	
governments,	 local	 governments,	 NGOs,	 private	 sector	 and	 international	 organisations.	 The	
respondents	 represent	 various	 regions	 such	 as	 Asia	 (78),	 America	 (8),	 Africa	 (7),	 Oceania	 (10)	 and	
Europe	 (37).	 The	 collected	 data	 was	 mainly	 analysed	 through	 the	 Relative	 Importance	 Index	 (RII)	
method	where	‘W’	is	the	weightage	given	to	each	factor,	‘A’	is	the	highest	weight	and	‘N’	is	the	number	
of	respondents.	
	
	
	
. 
The	 analysis	 comprised	 	 ranking	 the	 associated	 challenges	 and	 issues	 according	 to	 the	 relative	
importance	indices	globally	and	regionally	and	revealed	the	key	challenges	and	issues	in	the	existing	
legal/policy	and	science	approaches	from	a	global	perspective.	
4 Qualitative	Analysis	and	Findings		
This	 section	 critically	 reviews	 the	 issues/gaps	 in	 implementing	 the	 key	 global	 policies	 in	 the	 global	
context,	under	the	key	challenges/gaps	identified.	The	analysis	and	findings	are	based	on	the	literature	
synthesis	 as	 well	 as	 based	 on	 the	 interview	 findings.	 Further,	 the	 existing	 legal/policy	 and	 science	
approaches	 are	 reviewed	 by	 taking	 examples	 from	 the	 following	 disaster	 types:	 floods,	 droughts,	
winter-storms,	landslides,	earthquakes,	volcanic	eruptions	and	tsunamis.			
4.1 Challenges	and	Gaps	associated	with	Governance	
Arrangements	
4.1.1 Institutional	Arrangements				
Institutional	 barriers	 are	 identified	 as	 a	 key	 challenge	 which	 hinders	 the	 process	 of	 successful	
integration	of	CCA	into	DRR	(Gero	et	al.,	2010;	Schipper	and	Pelling,	2006;	Sperling	and	Szekely,	2005).	
For	example,	climate	change	policies	and	decisions	are	made	by	ministries	and	organizations	related	to	
the	 environment,	 whereas	 disaster	 management	 and	 reduction	 decisions	 are	 made	 by	 ministries	
related	to	infrastructure	development.	This	institutional	structure	disturbs	the	communication	process,	
which	generates	an	information	barrier	among	institutions	(Schipper	and	Pelling,	2006;	Sperling	and	
Szekely,	2005).	The	situation	is	further	aggravated	by	lack	of	simple	methods,	practical	tools,	lack	of	an	
enabling	environment	and	institutional	frameworks	(Kato,	2010	#520).		
	
Since	CCA	and	DRR	efforts	are	handled	by	two	sets	of	organizations,	their	inherited	cultures	prevent	or	
reduce	 effective	 integration	 (Schipper	 and	 Pelling,	 2006;	 UNISDR	 and	 UNDP,	 2012).	 In	 order	 to	
overcome	institutional	barriers	among	CCA	and	DRR,	a	common	institutional	structure	is	recommended	
(Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008).	Nevertheless,	some	institutions,	which	are	considered	as	effective	and	
efficient,	 take	 a	 long	 time	 over	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 measures	 due	 to	 the	 time	 taken	 for	
negotiations	and	consultations	with	interrelated	parties.	Vedwan	et	al.	(2008)	explains	this	situation	in	
his	study	related	to	lake	management	in	Florida.	According	to	Coppola	(2015),	one	of	the	significant	
obstacles	 for	 integrating	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 activities	 within	 Pacific	 Island	 Countries	 and	 Territories	 is,	
“Government	 institutional	 structures	 that	 silo	 CCA	 and	 DRR.”	 As	 a	 result,	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 are	 often	
compromised	 by	 poor	 collaboration	 and	 co-ordination	 among	 the	 communities	 of	 practice	 around	
 
 
 
 19	
disasters,	climate	change	and	development	(Hay,	2009).	As	such,	a	low	level	of	integration	is	observed	
within	the	Pacific	regions.	However,	Tonga	is	a	leading	example	of	integration	of	DRR	and	CCA	in	the	
region,	 having	 developed	 an	 integrated	 plan	 for	 Disaster	 Risk	 Management	 and	 climate	 change,	
including	 the	 reduction	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 (UNISDR	 and	UNDP,	 2012).	 Based	 on	 a	 study	
conducted	by	UNISDR	and	UNDP	(2012),	key	barriers	for	integration	in	the	Pacific	are:	
• Capacity	 constraints	 of	 Pacific	 Island	 countries	 (related	 to	 lack	 of	 co-ordination,	
communication,	political	will,	insufficient	funds	and	absence	of	expertise)	
• Separate	global	and	regional	frameworks	for	CCA	and	DRR	
• Perceptions	of	development	practitioners	that	DRR	and	CCA	are	not	valuable	
• Difficulty	quantifying	the	benefits	of	DRR	and	CCA	
	
Similarly,	within	Small	 Island	Developing	States,	the	most	common	governance	barrier	reported	was	
weak	 linkages	and	poor	co-ordination	between	the	tiers	of	government	(Kuruppu	and	Willie,	2015).	
This	resulted	in	inadequate	engagement	between	formal	national	adaptation	efforts	and	communities	
or	 Local	 Government,	 and	 poor	 communication	 between	 communities	 and	 government.	 Likewise,	
Jordan’s	institutional	arrangement	is	fragmented	where	responsibility	for	Climate	Change	Adaptation	
lies	with	 the	Ministry	of	Environment	while	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	 lies	primarily	with	Civil	Defense	
which	limits	institutional	co-ordination	between	different	sectors	(UNDP	and	IUCN,	2012).		
	
Likewise,	 when	 considering	 the	 Central	 American	 region,	 CCA	 is	 being	 mainly	 managed	 by	
environmental	 institutions.	 For	 	 example,	 in	Nicaragua,	 The	National	 Strategy	 on	 climate	 change	 is	
managed	by	a	top-down	structure,	where	the	decision-making	process	has	three	levels:	the	creation	of	
legislation	 by	 the	 National	 Assembly,	 its	 implementation	 by	 the	 ministries	 and	 their	 territorial	
delegations	and	its	management	by	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Natural	Resources	(Rivera,	2014).	
On	the	other	hand,	the	governmental	body	in	charge	of	co-ordinating	all	DRR	actions	is	the	National	
System	for	Disaster	Management	and	Prevention	and	this	has	been	identified	as	a	constraint	for	further	
integration	(Rivera,	2014).	
	
As	discussed	above,	institutional	barriers	are	one	of	the	main	factors	affecting	successful	CCA	and	DRR	
procedures	as	well	as	integration	of	both	CCA	and	DRR.	Institutional	barriers	can	also	be	identified	in	
terms	of	 the	structure	of	 institutions	 (Sperling	and	Szekely,	2005).	For	example,	 lack	of	 institutional	
capacity	among	Bhutan	CCA	programmes	hinders	the	adaptation	capacity.	This	is	further	complicated	
by	the	lack	of	adequate	experts	and	labourers	in	operating	Bhutan’s	adaptive	practices	(Meenawat	and	
Sovacool,	2011	#516).	Moreover,	within	South	Africa,	the	lack	of	capacity,	high	turnover	of	staff	within	
government	departments,	limited	understanding	of	and	expertise	in	tackling	climate-related	issues,	the	
positioning	 of	 climate	 change	 as	 an	 environmental	 issue	 rather	 than	 as	 a	 developmental	 issue,	
conservative	 financial	management	 practices	 and	 poor	 communication	 and	 co-ordination	 between	
departments	and	between	different	levels	of	government,	were	all	identified	as	barriers	to	addressing	
climate	change	across	a	range	of	South	African	studies	(Ziervogel	et	al.,	2014).	
	
Similarly,	according	to	Mukheibir	et	al.	(2013),	cited	in	Kuruppu	and	Willie	(2015),	Local	Government	in	
Australia	 face	 governance	 and	 resource	 limitations	 (that	 is,	 human,	 technical	 and	 financial)	 which	
includes	 competing	 priorities	 due	 to	 limited	 operational	 resourcing,	 poor	 communication	 and	 co-
ordination	 between	 various	 tiers	 of	 government	 and	 poor	 understanding	 of	 climate	 risks	 due	 to	
challenges	in	understanding	what	information	was	required,	where	to	find	it,	and	how	to	effectively	
use	it.	
	
Based	on	the	semi-structured	interviews,	it	was	evident	that	there	are	diverse	policies,	strategies	and	
budgetary	 allocations	 for	 implementing	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 and	 climate	 change	 adaption	 in	 the	
African	region.	As	a	result,	the	implementation	modalities	are	different	from	country	to	country.	37	out	
of	54	countries	 in	Africa	have	a	national	platform	 in	place	 for	DRR.	The	climate	change	community	
doesn't	have	a	very	strong	presence	on	the	national	platform.	In	general,	the	higher	political	profile	of	
the	institutions	are	responsible	for	climate	change,	compared	to	the	institutions	responsible	for	disaster	
reduction,	which	has		implications	for	monetary	allocations.	Co-ordination	challenges	are	also	common	
in	the	region	and	dialogue	between	the	DRR	and	the	CCA	communities	is	not	present	which	results	in	
huge	duplications.	One	of	the	interviewees	mentioned	that,	“They	don't	really	talk	to	each	other	and	
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the	 institutions	 don't	 talk	 to	 each	 other,	 so	 there	 are	 obvious	 monetary	 and	 implementation	
duplications	across	these	two	sets	of	activities	at	a	national	level.”	Another	key	challenge	is	the	sectoral	
implementation	of	development	activities.	As	DRR	and	CCA	run	across	different	sectors,	emphasis	on	
these	 is	 somewhat	 low	within	 the	 sectoral	 implementation.	 For	 	 example,	 Ethiopia	has	 two	 sets	of	
policies	and	strategies;	one	is	a	national	policy	and	strategy	on	disaster	risk	management,	which	has	an	
investment	framework	attached	to	it,	and	then	there	is	a	climate	resilient	and	green	economy	policy,	
which	is	on	the	climate	change	side	of	things.	The	two	sets	of	policies	are	implemented	by	two	sets	of	
institutions	and	both	have	sectoral	implementation	activities.	Figure	2	summarises	the	key	findings	of	
the	African	region.	
	
	
Figure	2-	Institutional	arrangements	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	Africa	
	
Similar	to	Africa,	Australia	also	has	divergent	government	structures	for	managing	DRR	and	CCA.	Local	
governments	have	a	 fair	amount	of	 responsibility	where	environmental	management	 is	at	 the	 local	
government	level	and	areas	such	as	natural	resources	management	is	at	the	state	government	level.	
When	 it	 comes	 to	 DRR,	 the	 primary	 responsibility	 is	 with	 the	 state	 government	 with	 some	
responsibilities	devolved	down	to	the	local	government	level.	As	such,	some	conflict	is	present	between	
the	three	layers	of	government	and	also	some	areas	of	responsibility	are	not	very	clearly	defined.	One	
of	the	interviewees	mentioned	that,	“We	don’t	have	a	unified	policy	for	climate	change	and	disaster	
risk.	 I	 mean,	 they	 are	 two	 completely	 different	 things	 and	 that’s	 how	 it’s	 treated	 here.”	 Figure	 3	
summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Australian	region.	
		
Figure	3-	Institutional	arrangements	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	Australia	
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In	Canada,	the	municipal	level	is	actually	responsible	for	implementing	CCA	and	DRR	with	the	assistance	
of	provincial	and	the	federal	levels.	However,	municipalities	are	not	placing	climate	change	at	the	top	
of	their	list	of	priorities	as	they	have	so	many	other	things	to	deal	with	more	immediately.	Therefore,	
it	is	more	of	a	peripheral	agenda	as	opposed	to	something	that	is	integrated	across	all		planning	policies.	
There	are	also	officials	at	the	provincial	and	federal	 levels	who	have	titles	related	to	climate	change	
adaptation	or	environmental	protection	and	so	forth.	However,	one	of	the	interviewees	stated	that,	
“They’re	ready	to	help	municipalities	deal	with	their	problem.”	Figure	4	summarises	the	key	findings	of	
the	Canadian	region.		
	
Figure	4-	Institutional	arrangements	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	Canada	
In	the	USA,	CCA	was	managed	by	executive	orders	and	not	legislative	acts,	which	can	be	easily	made	
and	are	now	being	easily	undone	by	the	current	administration.	Therefore,	at	the	moment,	there	is	a	
very	volatile	kind	of	policy	structure	to	deal	with	long-term	problems	like	climate	change.	As	such,	CCA	
and	DRR	are	not	well	 integrated	within	 the	 state,	 local	 and	 federal	 level	 activities.	 Even	within	 the	
federal	 level,	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	 and	 climate	 change	 responsibilities	 may	 lie	 within	 different	
agencies.	 For	 	 example,	 departments	 such	 as	 The	 United	 States	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency,	
Department	of	Homeland	Security,	The	Department	of	Defence,	Department	of	Energy	and	so	on	have	
some	responsibility	so	it	is	very	fragmented	and	lacks	a	unified	approach	to	either	of	the	issues.	Figure	
5	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	American	region.		
	
Figure	5-	Institutional	arrangements	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	USA	
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In	most	of	the	Asian	countries,	CCA	and	DRR	are	separate	portfolios	operated	by	different	ministries	
and	they	are	not	keen	to	change	their	agendas	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR.	Basically,	agencies	on	CCA	
and	DRR	want	to	work	in	their	space,	so	there	is	less	room	for	integration.	Theoretically,	they	should	
co-operate	but	they	are	competing	with	each	other	to	achieve	certain	goals.	Perceptional	difference	is	
a	 reason	 for	 this	 separation	 as	 CCA	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 	more	 advanced	 and	 strong,	whereas	 DRR	 is	
considered	 as	 non-scientific.	 DRR	 	 typically	 sits	 with	 emergency	 response.	 Longer	 term	 DRR	 is	 not		
considered	very	much.	However,	post-2015,	the	Sendai	Framework	is	a	key	tool	for	Asian	countries	to	
widen	their	 thinking	on	CCA	and	DRR.	Currently,	 the	global	and	 	regional	communities	are	trying	to	
force	countries	to	follow	it.	Figure	6	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Asian	region.	
	
Figure	6-	Institutional	arrangements	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	Asia	
4.1.2 Funding	Arrangements					
 
This	section	reviews	the	barriers	to	the	funding	arrangements	in	the	context	of	the	existing	legal/policy	
situation.		
	
Financial	matters	hinder		climate	change	adaptive	measures	(O'Brien,	2006	#270)	and	DRR	efforts.	As	
such,	 funding	 is	 a	 common	 barrier	 to	 the	 integration	 of	 CCA	 with	 DRR	 (UNISDR	 and	 UNDP,	 2012;	
Biesbroek	et	al.,	2010;	Sperling	and	Szekely,	2005;	,EFDRR,	2013;	Urwin	and	Jordan,	2008).	However,	it	
is	 important	 to	note	that,	as	per	 the	Paris	Agreement	on	Climate	Change,	 there	 is	an	obligation	 for	
developed	countries	to	take	the	responsibility	of	providing	funding	to	developing	countries	to	address	
climate	change	(SPC	et	al.,	2016).	
	
There	are	different	funding	systems	for	DRR	and	CCA	at	global,	regional	and	national	levels,	leading	to	
policy	and	 institutional	separation	 (UNISDR	and	UNDP,	2012).	For	 	example,	one	of	 the	key	 funding	
sources	 for	DRR	 is	 the	Global	 Facility	 for	Disaster	 Reduction	 and	Recovery	 (GFDRR)	which	provides	
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technical	and	financial	assistance	to	high	risk,	 low	income	countries.	GFDRR	traditionally	had	a	DRM	
focus	 and	 increasingly,	 incorporates	 climate	 change	 aspects	 (UNISDR	 and	UNDP,	 2012).	 The	Global	
Environment	Facility	and	Pilot	Program	for	Climate	Resilience	(PPCR)	is	one	of	the	funding	sources	for	
climate	change	within	the	Pacific	region	(UNISDR	and	UNDP,	2012).	In	addition,	donor	funding	usually	
encourages	 isolation	of	 specific	hazards	or	 issues	and	 therefore,	 it	 is	 one	of	 the	obstacles	 faced	by	
Pacific	 Island	 Countries	 and	 Territories	 in	 integrating	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 (Coppola,	 2015).	 Separation	 of	
funding	schemes	in	the	region	acts	as	a	barrier	to	integrating	CCA	with	DRR.	As	such,	the	creation	of	co-
ordinated	actions	between	CCA	and	DRR	would	avoid	the	duplication	of	effort	and	ensure	better	use	
of	 human	 and	 financial	 resources	 (Rivera,	 2014).	 Agreeing	 with	 this,	 Calliari	 and	 Mysiak	 (2013)	
highlighted	the	importance	of	combining	all	of	the	funding	instruments	by	enhancing		coherence	within	
the	post-2015	development	agenda.	The	Framework	for	Resilient	Development	 in	the	Pacific	 (2017-
2030)	advocates		the	adoption	of	integrated	approaches	in	managing	climate	change	and	disaster	risks,	
to	ensure	more	efficient	use	of	 resources,	 to	 rationalise	multiple	 sources	of	 funding	which	address	
similar	needs	and	for	more	effective	mainstreaming	of	risks	into	development	planning	and	budgets	
(SPC	et	al.,	2016).	This	is	a	welcome	initiative	within	the	Pacific	region	to	integrate	DRR	and	CCA.		
	
On	the	other	hand,	some	regions,	like	Africa,	are	extremely	deficient	in	funding.	For		example,	in	South	
Africa,	small	municipalities	have	no	capacity	to	act	on	climate	change	while	larger	metros	seek	external	
assistance	(Ziervogel	et	al.,	2014).	Furthermore,	international	adaptation	funding	modalities	did	little	
to	 address	 root	 causes	 of	 vulnerability	 in	 African	 and	 Caribbean	 Small	 Island	 Developing	 States	
(Kuruppu	 and	 Willie,	 2015).	 These	 funds	 were	 geared	 at	 supporting	 sectoral	 level	 adaptation	 for	
vulnerable,	natural	resource	sectors	such	as	water,	biodiversity	and	coastal	zones.	Similarly,	according	
to	Mukheibir	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 cited	 in	 Kuruppu	 and	Willie	 (2015),	 Local	 Government	 in	 Australia	 face	
financial	resource	limitations	which	includes	competing	priorities	due	to	limited	operational	resourcing.	
		
In	Jordan,	the	funding	gap	is	one	of	the	key	barriers	for	greater	integration	(UNDP	and	IUCN,	2012).	At	
the	 same	 time,	 as	 explained	 before,	 the	 institutional	 approach	 is	 fragmented	 as	 the	 primary	
responsibility	for	Climate	Change	Adaptation	lies	with	the	Ministry	of	Environment	while	Disaster	Risk	
Reduction	 lies	 primarily	 with	 Civil	 Defense	 (UNDP	 and	 IUCN,	 2012).	 These	 two	 governmental	
institutions	manage	parallel	structures	of	co-ordination,	different	national	budgets,	different	strategies	
and	different	sources	of	external	funding	which	limit	the	institutional	co-ordination	(UNDP	and	IUCN,	
2012).	
Even	within	 disaster	 risk	 reduction,	 as	UNISDR	 and	UNDP	 (2012)	 points	 out,	 funding	 is	 not	 equally	
allocated	 between	 relief,	 reconstruction	 and	 prevention.	 For	 example,	 for	 every	 $100	 spent	 on	
disasters	 and	 risks,	 $96	 is	 spent	 on	 emergency	 relief	 and	 reconstruction.	 This	 highlights	 the	 poor	
financial	arrangement	for	disaster	reduction	as	a		preventive	measure.	As	such,	many	DRR	programmes	
are	 funded	 by	 humanitarian	 budgets,	 whereas	 CCA	 programmes	 are	 funded	 by	 environmental	
departments	(Mitchell	et	al.,	2010).	Funding	for	DRR	is	ad-hoc	and	insufficient	because	humanitarian	
assistance	fails	to	provide	less	allocation	for	DRR	whereas	funding	for	CCA	is	sizeable	and	increasing	
(Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008).	For		example,	in	Nicaragua,	CCA	is	more	attractive	for	obtaining	technical	
and	financial	support	from	international	aid	agencies	(Rivera,	2014)	compared	to	DRR.		
	
Most	 adaptation	 strategies	 do	 not	 have	 commitments	 towards	 financial	 resources	 due	 to	 lack	 of	
knowledge	on	the	cost	of	adaptation	(Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010).	It	is	therefore	proposed	to	
integrate	preventive	measures	into	development	plans	rather	than	establishing	different	funding	for	
prevention	 (Sperling	 and	 Szekely,	 2005).	 There	 would	 be	 complex	 and	 expensive	 overlaps	 within	
financial	commitments	in	disaster	relief	programmes.	Funding	organisations	for	climate	change	may	be	
reluctant	to	integrate	funding	in	DRR	programmes,	since	their	primary	concern	is	on	climate	change	
rather	than	climate	variability	(Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008).	Also,	lack	of	knowledge	on	disaster	risk	
transfer	mechanisms,	such	as	knowledge	on	financing	DRR,	would	limit	the	effectiveness	of	adaptive	
measures	(Kato,	2010	#520).	In	contrast,	when	funding	is	available,	there	will	be	issues	for	allocating	
resources	among	priorities.	For	example,	in	Bhutan,	the	issue	of	prioritizing	resources	among	projects	
is	 identified	 as	 a	 limitation	 in	 the	 existing	 legal/policy	 background	 (Meenawat	 and	 Sovacool,	 2011	
#516).		
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Based	on	the	findings	of	the	semi-structured	interviews,	it	was	evident	that,	in	the	African	region,	it	is	
somewhat	difficult	to	differentiate	between	the	funding	for	DRR	and	CCA.	As	a	result,	the	same	project	
proposals	are	submitted	to	DRR	and	CCA	funding	streams	while	activities	remain	the	same.	Moreover,	
the	funding	allocations	are	not	regular	for	both	DRR	and	CCA.	Donor	funding	has	a	major	role	apart	
from	the	national	budgets	for	DRR	and	CCA,	where	policies	and	strategies	for	implementation	result	in	
different	budgetary	allocations.		Figure	7	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	African	region.	
	
Figure	7-	Funding	arrangements	for	CCA	and	DRR	–	Africa	
In	the	USA,	funding	is	fragmented	for	both	DRR	and	CCA.	There	are	multiple	funding	streams	for	local	
governments	and	individuals.	However,	funding	is	limited,	especially	for	DRR.	However,	there	is	funding	
for	DRR	which	can	be	used	only	if	a	disaster	happens.	Funding	for	CCA	is	largely	dependent	on	political	
will	 and	whether	 the	authoritative	body	 is	 from	a	 state	which	believes	 in	 climate	 change;	 then	 the	
funding	will	be	available.	Also,	coastal	states	believe	CCA	is	needed	compared	to	central	states	and	as	
a	result,	comparatively	more	funding	is	available	for	coastal	states.	Figure	8	summarises	the	key	findings	
of	the	American	region.	
	
	
Figure	8-	Funding	arrangements	for	CCA	and	DRR	–	USA	
In	Australia,	one	of	the	major	issues	is	that	there	is	no	unified	approach	for	CCA	at	a	federal	level	and	
therefore,	the	availability	of	funding	is	highly	dependent	on	the	political	party	 in	power	at	the	state	
government	level.	However,	in	relation	to	DRR,	the	pool	of	funding	is	available	for	DRR	activities	and	
the	state	government	can	apply	for	this	funding	and	issue	it	to	local	governments	for	implementation.	
Figure	9	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Australian	region.		
	
Figure	9-	Funding	arrangements	for	CCA	and	DRR	–	Australia	
In	contrast,	funding	for	DRR	is	not	a	priority	in	Canada’s	municipal	levels.	As	such,	funding	for	DRR	is	
mostly	available		for	post-disaster	activities	when	there	has	been		a	disaster.	On	the	other	hand,	there	
is	 no	 funding	 for	 CCA	 as	 it	 is	 not	 recognised	 or	 prioritised.	 Most	 of	 the	 communities	 and	 council	
members	do	not	believe	in	climate	change	as	a	concept	or	a	phenomenon.	Figure	10	summarises	the	
key	findings	of	the	Canadian	region.		
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Figure	10-	Funding	arrangements	for	CCA	and	DRR	–	Canada	
There	 are	 diverse	 funding	 allocations	 in	Asia.	 The	donor	 perspective	 is	 based	more	on	 science	 and	
evidence	based	approaches	than	applied		approaches.	As	a	result,	CCA	gets	more	funding,	as	CCA	is	
science	based	and	evidence	based.	This	scenario	is	common	among	the	global	funding	bodies	which	
support	Asia.	DRR	has	less	funding	as	it	is	mainly	seen	from	the	humanitarian	angle,	but,	not	from	the	
development	angle.	One	of	 the	major	 issues	 in	Asia	 is	 that	 some	major	 international	 funds	are	not	
suitable	for	the	real	needs	at	ground	level.	Therefore,	in	order	to	access	funding,	authorities	need	to	
follow		guidelines	which	are	not	the	exact	requirement.	Figure	11	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	
Asian	region.	
	
	
Figure	11-	Funding	arrangements	for	CCA	and	DRR	–	Asia	
4.1.3 Political	Will	and	Motivation		
 
This	section	critically	reviews	the	political	will	and	motivation	in	integrating	CCA	and	DRR	within	the	
global	context.	There	is		widespread	recognition	of	the	importance	of	integrating	DRR	and	CCA	within	
the	 academic	 community	 and	 practitioners	 (Rivera,	 2014).	 Political	 will	 and	 motivation	 are	 of	
paramount	importance	in	integrating	CCA	and	DRR	at	the	national	level.	A	key	challenge	to	integrating	
DRR	and	CCA	is	low	political	will	in	favour	of	integration	(Gero	et	al.,	2011;	UNISDR,	2010b;	UNISDR	and	
UNDP,	 2012).	Dupuis	 (2011)	 highlights	 that,	 irrespective	of	 developed	or	 developing	 countries,	 low	
political	interest	to	integrate	will	remain	a	key	challenge.	There	is		weak	political	recognition	for	DRR	
when	compared	to	CCA	(Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008;	Venton	and	Trobe,	2008).	In	order	to	create	an	
enabling	environment	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR,	political	commitment	should	be	increased	by		high-
level	political	authorities	(UNISDR,	2010b).		
	
Political	motivations	diverge	between	countries	in	varying	degrees.	According	to	a	study	conducted	by	
Rivera	(2014)	in	relation	to	Nicaragua,	many	aspects	of	CCA	are	integrated	into	the	DRR	frameworks	at	
national	and	regional	levels	in	Central	America.	This	was	achieved	through	the	approval	of	the	‘Policy	
on	Comprehensive	Disaster	Risk	Management	in	Central	America’	in	2010,	with	a	specific	focus	on	CCA;	
through	the	‘National	Policy	of	Disaster	Risk	Reduction’	to	be	approved	by	the	National	Assembly	with	
 
 
 
 26	
a	chapter	on	CCA	and	by	way	of	modifying	DRR	plans	at	local	level	with	CCA	aspects	(Rivera,	2014).	This	
shows	the	political	will	and	motivation	within	Central	America	towards	integrating	CCA	and	DRR.	
	
However,	according	to	Coppola	(2015),	one	of	the	obstacles	for	integrating	CCA	and	DRR	in	Pacific	Island	
Countries	 and	 Territories	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	 indicators	 and	 accountability	measures	 to	 ensure	 the	
implementation	 of	 CCA	 and	 DRR	measures.	 This	 is	 aggravated	 by	 the	 weak	 partnerships	 between	
institutions	responsible	for	CCA	and	DRR	(Coppola,	2015).	Moreover,	climate	change	adaptation	and	
disaster	 risk	 reduction	 initiatives	 in	 Pacific	 Island	Countries	 are	 frequently	 undermined	by	 a	 lack	 of	
political	will,	insufficient	funds	or	the	absence	of	expertise	and	guidance	(Hay,	2009).	However,	in	the	
Pacific,	there	is	more	political	will	for	climate	change	adaptation	compared	to	DRR	(UNISDR	and	UNDP,	
2012).	As	such,	it	is	evident	that	there	is	limited	political	will	among	those	in	the	disaster	management	
and	environmental	communities	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR	mandates	(Coppola,	2015).		
	
Even	within	the	field	of	disasters,	political	will	varies	depending	on	the	requirements.	In	dealing	with	
disasters,	political	will	or	support	is	a	major	determinant.	Lack	of	political	support	hinders	the	disaster	
risk	 reduction	 efforts	 (Nabi	 and	 Khan,	 2014	 #518).	 Political	 culture	 and	 governance	 norms	 impact	
effective	DRR	in	Jordan	(Al-Nammari	and	Alzaghal,	2015	#246).	For		example,	political	interest	in	natural	
hazards	 is	at	 its	highest	during,	and	shortly	after,	a	disaster.	Although	a	commitment	to	“build	back	
better”	 can	 help	 salvage	 some	 of	 the	 lost	 opportunities,	 funding	 for	 prevention	 measures	 and	
preparedness	is	hard	to	come	by	when	there	has	not	been	a	devastating	natural	disaster	(UNDP	and	
IUCN,	 2012).	 In	 South	 Africa,	 the	 silo	 approach	 of	 government	 departments	 does	 not	 support	 an	
integrated	approach	to	addressing	climate	change	adaptation	(Ziervogel	et	al.,	2014).	Although	policy	
is	 changing,	 authors	 have	 identified	 the	 importance	 of	 altering	 the	 political	 and	 bureaucratic	
infrastructure	 to	 support	more	 integrated,	 cross-sectoral	 responses.	 In	African	and	Caribbean	Small	
Island	Developing	States,	the	lack	of	focus	of	Local	Government	or	Island	Councils	and	communities	on	
the	 adaptive	 capacity	 needs	was	 a	 key	 barrier	 to	 ensuring	 the	 success	 of	 adaptation	 interventions	
(Kuruppu	 and	Willie,	 2015).	 The	 capacity	 of	 government	 officials	 further	 limits	 the	 engagement	 in	
climate	diplomacy	at	the	international	level.		
	
Similarly,	according	to	Mukheibir	et	al.	 (2013),	Local	Government	 in	Australia	 faces	governance	and	
resource	limitations	(that	is,	human,	technical	and	financial)	which	includes	competing	priorities	due	to	
limited	 operational	 resourcing,	 poor	 communication	 and	 co-ordination	 between	 various	 tiers	 of	
government	 and	 poor	 understanding	 of	 climate	 risks	 due	 to	 challenges	 in	 understanding	 what	
information	was	required,	where	to	find	it,	and	how	to	effectively	use	it.	
	
Based	on	the	results	of	the	semi-structured	interviews,	it	was	evident	that	political	will	towards	CCA	
and	 DRR	 is	 limited	 in	 the	 African	 region.	 Although	 it	 is	 present	 in	 very	 few	 countries,	 political	will	
towards	 integrating	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 is	 limited.	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	
importance	of	CCA,	DRR	and	their	integration.	For		example,	one	of	the	interviewees	stated,	“The	right	
level	of	understanding	is	not	yet	there	in	the	political	class	or	the	decision	makers.”	Political	leaders	
often	consider	DRR	as	equivalent	to	emergency	response	and	as	a	result,	less	emphasis	is	given	to	DRR	
activities.	Figure	12	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	African	region.	
     	
	
Figure	12-	Political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	-	Africa	
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Similar	to	the	African	region,	emphasis	on	climate	change	is	somewhat	less	in	Australia.	Some	of	the	
political	 leaders	 assume	 that	 climate	 change	 is	 not	 an	 immediate	 disaster	 and	 the	 political	 will	 is	
dependent	on	the	party	in	power.	One	of	the	interviewees	mentioned,	“Lots	of	climate	change	deniers	
are	in	power.”	As	such,	the	political	willingness,	especially	towards	CCA,	depends	on	which	party	is	in	
power.	Figure	13	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Australian	region.		
	
Figure	13-	Political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	-	Australia	
In	contrast,	according	to	interviewees,	political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	in	Canada	depends	
on	the	cost	of	the	actions.	All	actions	are	dependent	on	councils,	community	and	the	private	sector	
buy-in.		Figure	14	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Canadian	region.	
	
	
Figure	14-	Political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	-	Canada	
In	the	USA,	the	concept	of	DRR	is	more	acceptable	at	a	political	level	compared	to	CCA.	As	such,	the	
political	will	for	humanitarian	aid	and	for	mitigation	aid	against	disasters	is	a	little	more	positive	than	it	
is	for	climate	change,	unless	the	risk	and	the	disaster	are	in	some	way	associated	with	an	extraction	
industry:	coal	or	oil.	Political	will	to	deal	with	things	like	fracking	is	much	less	than	it	is	for		dealing	with	
things	like	wildfires	which	are	less	tied	to	a	strong	economic	sector.		As	most	of	the	issues	related	to	
climate	change	and	risk	reduction	are	long-term	issues,	unless	politicians	see	a	short-term	gain	from	it,	
they	 are	 not	willing	 to	 invest.	With	 the	 current	 political	 climate,	 at	 the	 federal	 level,	 interviewees	
believed	 that	 there	 is	 no	 strong	 push	 for	 looking	 at	 climate	 change.	 Figure	 15	 summarises	 the	 key	
findings	of	the	American	region.		
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Figure	15-	Political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	USA	
In	Asia,	since	many	Asian	countries	are	still	developing,	politicians	are	more	keen	on	socio-economic	
development	than	DRR	or	CCA;	 the	strategy	 is	aimed	more	towards	disaster	response	than	disaster	
management.	In	many	cases,	communities	in	Asia	expect	socio-economic	development	rather	than	CCA	
or	DRR.	Within	this	context,	there	is	a	lack	of	political	will	for	integration	which	is	an	institutional	issue	
in	Asia.	In	many	countries,	since	CCA	and	DRR	are	under	different	institutions,	there	is	a	lack	of	political	
will,	as	politicians		tend	to	consider	matters	only	within	their	own	ministry.	However,	political	bodies	in	
some	Asian	countries	have	shown	some	interest	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR.	The	Philippines		have	shown	
the	highest	level	of	political	confidence	by	bringing	two	legislative	orders	for	both	the	domains	to	come	
together.	In	Sri	Lanka,	the	Department	of	Meteorology	and	the	Disaster	Management	Centre	are	under	
one	ministry.	
	
It	was	revealed	that	at	the	state	level,	CCA	has	much	more	attention	than	DRR.	CCA	has	more	political	
attention	than	DRR	in	Asia	as	a	result	of	two	key	global	agreements.	Since	the	Paris	Agreement	 is	a	
global	 agenda,	 agreed	 by	 the	 head	 of	 states,	 it	 has	 become	 legally	 binding,	 whereas	 the	 Sendai	
Framework	 is	 mainly	 within	 Disaster	 Management	 ministries	 and	 not	 necessarily	 legally	 binding.	
Therefore,	 CCA	 has	 received	 	 state	 level	 attention	whereas	 DRR	 has	 only	 	ministry	 level	 attention.	
However,	for	local	political	bodies	in	Asia,	DRR	is	much	more	important	than	CCA	as	local	political	bodies	
are	 in	 direct	 contact	with	 the	 people.	 Therefore,	 they	 are	more	 interested	 in	DRR	 as	 they	 need	 to	
respond	to	the	queries	of	the	public.		CCA	is	generally	future	oriented,	therefore,	local	politicians	cannot	
gain	political	points	from	CCA.	Figure	16	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Asian	region.	
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Figure	16-	Political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	–	Asia	
4.1.4 Stakeholder	Complexity		
 
This	section	reviews	the	challenges/gaps	under	stakeholder	complexity	in	the	context	of	implementing	
existing	legal/policy	and	science	approaches	across	the	globe.		
	
An	effective	integration	of	CCA	with	DRR	requires	the	participation	of	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders:	
policy	 makers,	 private	 firms,	 scientists,	 NGOs	 and	 educators	 (IPCC,	 2012;	 UNISDR,	 2009a).	 Multi-
stakeholders	and	multi-sectoral	processes	are	vital	 in	building	common	understanding,	commitment	
and	consensus	(UNISDR,	2009b).	However,	co-ordination	of	these	different	stakeholders	with	different	
interests	is	one	of	the	challenges	to	integration	due	to	the	inability	of	arriving	at		consensus	on	specific	
adaptation	measures	(Lei	and	Wang,	2014).	Furthermore,	weak	co-ordination	between	stakeholders,	
lack	of	know-how	and	poor	communication	between	stakeholders,	especially	between	government	and	
local	communities,	were	some	of	the	key	challenges	faced	by	Jordan	(UNDP	and	IUCN,	2012).	Similar	
challenges	were	observed	by	Coppola	 (2015)	 in	Pacific	 Island	Countries	and	Territories	and	 the	key	
obstacles	were	poor	communication	between	stakeholders	and	different	levels	of	government,	weak	
partnerships	 between	 institutions	 responsible	 for	 supporting	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 and	 power	 struggles	
between	stakeholders	responsible	for	DRR	and	CCA. On	the	other	hand,	Sovacool	(2011	#517)	observed	
that	experts	and	the	community	may	not	come	to	an	agreement	with	hard	and	soft	climate	change	
adaptation	measures	in	the	Maldives.	This	leads	to	a	divergence	among	policy	makers	and	planners	in	
CCA	towards	two	different	paths	due	to	the	complexity	of	stakeholders	(Sovacool,	2011	#517).	 
	
Moreover,	 decision	 makers	 are	 interested	 in	 scientific	 information	 on	 climate	 change	 to	 support	
decisions	 regarding	 adaptation	 (Mastrandrea	 et	 al.,	 2010).	Most	 top-down	 approaches	 are	 used	 in	
climate	impact	assessment,	whereas	bottom-up	approaches	are	applicable	in	acquiring	knowledge	of	
vulnerabilities	at	the	decision-making	level.	Accordingly,	developing	an	integrated	approach	to	inform	
decision-making	 has	 become	 a	 difficult	 task	 (Mastrandrea	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Thomalla	 et	 al.,	 2006).	
Furthermore,	effective	integration	of	CCA	into	practice	requires	inter-sectoral	and	participative	work	
which	includes	stakeholders	and	practitioners	at	national	and	local	levels	and	related	monitoring	and	
learning	mechanisms	(Rivera,	2014).	
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In	 Africa,	 key	 stakeholders	 at	 the	 inter-governmental	 level	 are	 the	 African	Union	 and	 the	 Regional	
Economic	 Communities.	 The	 key	 role	 of	 these	 organisations	 is	 to	 ensure	 inter-governmental	 co-
ordination	 and	 political	 co-ordination	 across	 the	 continent	 and	 across	 the	 regions	 of	 Africa.	 The	
member	 states	 play	 a	 very	 important	 role	 and	 they	 share	 the	 key	 stakeholders	 in	 terms	 of	
implementation	 of	 CCA	 and	 DRR.	 However,	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 resources	 across	 the	 continent,	 the	
development	partners,	in	particular	the	donors,	United	Nations,	the	NGOs	and	the	community	based	
organisations,	play	a	very	important	role	in	the	implementation	of	roles	and	responsibilities	on	CCA	and	
DRR.	The	role	of	the	developing	partners	is	mainly	twofold:	resource	allocation	and	working	with	the	
member	states	and	key	actors	on	the	inter-governmental	side	for	implementation.		
	
However,	 as	 the	 national	 policies	 and	 strategies	 are	 different,	 the	 institutional	 structures	 of	 the	
Government	on	DRR	and	climate	change	vary	across	the	region.	The	stakeholders	have	to	talk	to	two	
sets	of	institutions	for	CCA	and	DRR,	which	complicates		matters	because	then	it	doesn't	really	address	
the	 issue	 of	 the	 overlaps	 and	 gaps	 between	 the	 two	 sets	 of	 actions.	 So,	 the	 different	 sets	 of	
stakeholders,	even	sometimes	a	common	set	of	stakeholders,	have	to	talk	to	two	different	institutional	
structures	in	the	Government	for	their	respective	domains	of	CCA	and	DRR.	Figure	17	summarises	the	
key	findings	of	the	African	region.		
		
Figure	17-	Stakeholder	complexity	in	CCA	and	DRR	–	Africa	
In	the	USA,	the	key	stakeholders	are	the	various	government	levels,	the	private	sector	and	the	scientific	
community.	For		example,	in	the	oil	industry,	the	carbon	industries	represent	major	stakeholders.	There	
are	also	lots	of	non-profit	organisations	such	as	the	Rockefeller	Foundation	and	many	environmental	
non-profit	groups	working	on	CCA	and	DRR.	Political	parties	are	also		major	stakeholders	when	it	comes	
to	CCA	and	DRR.	For	particular	projects,	legal	frameworks	and	policies	require	bringing	together		all	the	
stakeholders.	For		example,	if	a	new	coal	burning	power	plant	needs	to	be	built,	regulations	now	require	
a	 great	 deal	 of	 input	 from	 different	 groups.	 It	 requires	 filing	 an	 environmental	 impact	 statement,	
ergonomic	 impact	 statements	 and	 consideration	 of	 the	 public	 health	 aspects.	 All	 those	 things	 are	
required	so	in	that	sense,	it	will	literally	bring	all	groups	together	around	specific	projects,	whether	it	is	
a	dam	or	a	pipeline	or	a	nuclear	power	plant.	Figure	18	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	American	
region.		
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Figure	18-	Stakeholder	complexity	in	CCA	and	DRR	–	USA	
It	was	evident	that,	in	Australia,	stakeholder	engagement	is	minimal	in	terms	of	CCA.	The	main	reason		
is	that	the	political	will		to	engage	with	the	community	is	not	there.	However,	in	terms	of	DRR,	there	is	
a	significant	emphasis	on	stakeholder	engagement	and	there	is	a	great	deal	of	community	engagement.	
A	lot	of		information	is	also	being	provided.	Moreover,	there	is	much	engagement	during	disasters,	and	
also	post-disasters,	with	the	community	and	other	stakeholders.	Figure	19	summarises	the	key	findings	
of	the	Australian	region.	 		
	
Figure	19-	Stakeholder	complexity	in	CCA	and	DRR	–	Australia	
The	role	of	stakeholders	 is	not	clearly	defined	in	Canada	compared	to	other	countries	 in	Europe.	As	
such,	it	is	important	to	identify	who	the	stakeholders	are	and	what	their	role	actually	should	be.	Even	
at	the	municipal	level,	the	municipal	staff,	the	civic	body	itself,	even	internally,	do	not	know	which	staff		
should	be	working	on	the	problems	of	climate	change	and	risk	reduction.	Figure	20	summarises	the	key	
findings	of	the	Canadian	region.	
	
Figure	20-	Stakeholder	complexity	in	CCA	and	DRR	–	Canada	
In	Asia,	stakeholder	management	is	complex	at	the	state	or	sub-state	level.	In	some	Asian	countries,	
stakeholder	responsibilities	are	not	clearly	defined	and	there	is	no	guidance	or	policy	framework	for	
stakeholder	management.	However,	there	are	positive	regional	stakeholder	engagement	programmes	
in	 Asia,	 for	 example,	 the	 Asian	 Disaster	 Preparedness	 Centre	 organizes	 the	 Regional	 Consultative	
Committee	on	Disaster	Management,	which	is	a	platform	for	stakeholder	engagement	in	Asia.		
	
Post-2015,	the	global	agenda	has	provided	a	platform	for	CCA	and	DRR	stakeholders.	Before	the	Sendai	
Framework,	 there	 was	 a	 great	 separation	 between	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 stakeholders.	 For	 example,	 CCA	
stakeholders	did	not	even	want	to	attend		DRR	conferences.	However,	now		things	are	changing	for	the	
better	in	Asia	as	a	whole.	In	addition,		politicians	in	Asia	are	now	keen	to	attend		both	CCA	and	DRR	
activities	after	implementing	the	Sendai	Framework.	Similarly,	donors	are	participating	with	interest	in	
both	CCA	and	DRR.	Figure	21	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Asian	region.	
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Figure	21-	Stakeholder	complexity	in	CCA	and	DRR	–	Asia	
4.2 Challenges	and	Gaps	related	to	Communication	
This	section	reviews	the	communication	and	information	gaps	in	the	context	of	implementing	existing	
legal/policy	and	science	approaches	across	the	globe.		
	
According	to	IFRC	(2008),	climate	information	in	the	form	of	trends	and	forecasts,	with	tried	and	tested	
DRR	 measures,	 assist	 in	 anticipating	 disasters	 before	 they	 happen.	 As	 such,	 when	 developing	
appropriate	 strategies	 to	 respond	 to	 or	 reduce	 disaster	 risk	 and	 adapt	 to	 climate	 change,	 	 	 sound	
information	is	required	(Birkmann	and	Pardoe,	2014).	There	are	many	sources	of	climate	information.	
Practitioners	 working	 in	 the	 field	 of	 climate	 change,	 including	 academics	 and	 scientists,	 provide	
valuable	 information	 to	 enhance	 understanding	 of	 climate	 variability	 and	 change	 (IFRC,	 2008).	
Furthermore,	community	knowledge	is	indeed	important	for	better	understanding	of		climate	change	
and	disaster	risks	(IFRC,	2008).	According	to	IFRC	(2008),	this	information	needs	to	be	provided	in	forms	
that	are	 sector	 specific	and	 translated	 into	practical	 risk	 reduction	measures.	There	are	many	good	
examples	 of	 adapting,	 responding	 and	 reacting	 to	 natural	 hazards,	 including	 climate	 change,	
throughout	 	 history.	 However,	 they	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 explored	 and	 documented	 (Garcia-
Acosta,	2017)	which	is	one	of	the	major	challenges.		
	
As	such,	a	lack	of	information	on	the	importance	of	adapting	to	climate	change	and	lack	of	knowledge	
about	available	options	are	some	of	the	barriers	in	CCA	(O'Brien	et	al.,	2006	#270;	Measham	et	al.,	2011	
#515).	According	to	Manoj	and	Baker	(2007	#519),	the	9/11	attack	and	Hurricane	Katrina	have	shown	
good	 examples	 of	 communication	which	 prevails	 during	 the	 disaster	 reduction	 efforts.	 He	 explains	
three	 types	 of	 communication	 challenges:	 technological	 challenges,	 sociological	 challenges	 and	
organizational	 challenges.	 He	 further	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 these	 three	 types	 of	
communication	in	creating	an	effective	disaster	communication	system.	Technological	challenges	are	
a	result	of	scientific	contribution	or	background.	For	example,	in	a	post-disaster	situation,	maintenance	
of	proper	communication,	as	well	as	development	of	a	new	communication	system,	is	very	difficult.	In	
terms	of	sociological	concerns,	the	trustworthiness	of	information,	ethical	considerations	and	security	
are	the	challenges.	Organizational	challenges	arise	when	dealing	with	the	number	of	groups	that	belong	
to	hierarchical	decision-making	which	prevent	or	hinder	decision-making	 in	an	ad-hoc,	dynamic	and	
flatter	environment.	The	organizational	challenge	of	communication	can	be	considered	as	a	result	of	
the	legal/policy	basis.		
	
 
 
 
 33	
Furthermore,	 according	 to	 the	 Adaptation	 Knowledge	 Platform	 (2010),	 the	 challenge	 lies	 in	 how	
information	can	be	 interpreted	for	decision-makers	which	 is	essential	 for	 long-term	planning	and	to	
boost	understanding	of	CCA.	As	such,	it	is	important	to	improve	communication	strategies	to	interpret	
data	 and	 information	 for	 decision-makers	 to	 conduct	 long-term	 planning	 and	 knowledge-based	
solutions	(Adaptation	Knowledge	Platform,	2010).		
	
In	 Africa,	 gaps	 exist	 in	 communication	 between	 academia	 and	 practitioners	 as	 well	 as	 between	
practitioners	and	the	general	public.	Most		practitioners	follow	global,	practice-based	documents	rather	
than	academic	publications.	As	a	result,	most	of	the	works	of	the	academic	community	do	not	 fully	
reach	the	practitioners.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	a	huge	gap	in	transferring	practitioners’	knowledge	
to	the	general	public.	One	reason	for	this	is	a	lack	of	awareness	by	the	general	public	on	the	work	that	
CCA	and	DRR	practitioners	are	conducting.	There	are	lots	of	community	awareness	campaigns	in	the	
region.	However,	these		do	not	reach	the	general	public	and	there	is	a	need	to	improve	this.	Figure	22	
summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	African	region.		
	
Figure	22-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	communication–	Africa	
In	 the	USA,	 the	communication	between	academia	and	practitioners	differs	depending	on	different	
practitioners.	For		example,	it	depends	on	different	government	levels;	at	the	federal	level,	it	is	much	
easier	to	communicate	compared	to	the	local	level	as	they	are	not	as	knowledgeable.	It	is	also	easy	to	
communicate	with	research	groups,	as	they	comprise	 	academics	and	practitioners.	Communication	
between	practitioners	and	the	general	public	is	mostly	supported	by	the	World	Wide	Web,	as	most	of	
the	 information	 is	 available	 and	 accessible	 online.	 Figure	 23	 summarises	 the	 key	 findings	 of	 the	
American	region.	
	
	
Figure	23-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	communication	–	USA	
In	Australia,	 there	 is	very	 little	communication	between	DRR	and	CCA	communities	and	as	a	 result,	
there	is	no	established	information	flow	between	the	two	fields.	In	DRR,	communication	sometimes	
becomes		challenging	when		people	in	the	areas	are	from	multi-cultural	nationalities.	Therefore,	it	is	
important	 to	 identify	 the	 most	 suitable	 communication	 channels	 for	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 disaster	
management	cycle,	for		example,	in	the		preparedness	phase,		social	media	plays	a	huge	role.	When	
looking	at	the	communication	between	practitioners	and	the	general	public,	institutions	do	not	directly	
communicate	with	the	public	unless	a	local	authority	funds	the	project	or	the	project	outcomes	need	
to	be	shared	with	the	community.	Figure	24	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Australian	region.		
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Figure	24-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	communication	–	Australia	
In	contrast,	communication	between	academics	and	practitioners	is	easy	in	Canada	as	both	parties	are	
trained	and	the	level	of	understanding	is	high.	However,	communication	between	practitioners	and	the	
general	public	is	challenging,	as	the	level	of	understanding	is	not	the	same.	There	are	consultant	firms	
which	handle	the	communication	between	councils	and	the	community.	Most	of	the	time,	the	problem	
is	not	with	the	quality	of	communication	but	whether	the	community		wants	to	accept	the	issues	that	
practitioners	want	to	communicate.	Figure	25	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Canadian	region.		
	
Figure	25-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	communication	–	Canada	
In	Asia,	one	of	the	key	issues,	with	regard	to	communication	between	the	academic	community	and		
practitioners,	 is	that	academic	research	 is	not	continuous	and	stops	at	the	pilot	stage.	Further,	new	
tools	and	techniques	from	academic	research	are	not	generally	transferred	to		practice.	In	most	cases,	
new	tools	and	techniques	for	CCA	and	DRR	are	tried	and	evaluated	only	for	academic	research.	They	
are	not	 transferred	to	 	practitioners.	When	practitioners	need	to	address	 issues	related	to	CCA	and	
DRR,	they	have	to	use	the	same	old	tools	and	techniques.			
	
Furthermore,	in	some	Asian	countries,	people	are	not	aware	of	common	terminology	related	to	CCA	
and	DRR,	for	example,	in		Thailand,	there	is	no	specific	word	for	DRR.	So,	communicating	this	concept	
to	 the	 general	 public	 has	 become	 difficult.	 Further,	 it	 was	 highlighted	 that	 complex	 scientific	
information	related	to	CCA	and	DRR	should	be	transferred	to		common	practice.	However,	there	are	
issues	with	the	information	flow	to	the	general	public	in	Asia.	Basically,	there	are	some	mechanisms	to	
communicate	with	the	general	public	at	the	state	level	but,	when	it	comes	to	the	local	or	community	
level,	 the	 information	 is	not	transferred	properly	due	to	various	reasons	such	as	 language	 issues.	 In	
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addition,	there	are	issues	with	the	mode	of	communication.	Generally,	there	are	no	specific	guidelines	
to	address	 the	 special	needs	of	 communities	 such	as	 communicating	 information	 to	blind	and	deaf	
people	and	information	sharing	with		people	who	are	illiterate.	One	of	the	major	issues	is	that	additional	
information	is	not	shared	with	the	general	public.	In	most	of	the	Asian	countries,	people	are	given	only	
general	 information	 but	 not	 specific,	 or	 additional,	 information,	 for	 example,	 in	 flood	 prone	 areas,	
people	are	informed	that	there	is	a	flood	risk	and	information,	such	as	an	evacuation	strategy,	is	not	
provided.	So,	people	are	not	that	interested	in	the	general	information	provided.		
	
In	addition	to	that,	there	are	major	issues	with	the	information	management	related	to	CCA	and	DRR.	
Many	 relevant	 government	 bodies	 in	 several	 countries	 of	 Asia	 do	 not	 keep	 a	 good	 record	 of	 data,	
therefore,	they	cannot	issue	information	when	needed.	Countries	have	legal	provisions	for	the	right	to	
information,	such	as	India,	but	not	to	collect	information.	Therefore,	obtaining	information	from	the	
government	bodies	is	extremely	difficult.	Figure	26	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	Asian	region.	
 
Figure	26-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	communication	–	Asia	
 
 
4.3 Challenges	and	Gaps	related	to	Scientific	Innovations	
This	section	critically	reviews	the	challenges/gaps	associated	with	scientific	innovations	in	the	context	
of	the	existing	legal/policy	situation.	
	
One	of	the	key	gaps	for	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	is	the	unrecognised	link	between	community	
initiatives	and	scientific	knowledge.	Traditional/indigenous	knowledge	at	the	community	 level	 is	the	
basis	for	DRR,	whereas	traditional/indigenous	knowledge	is	insufficient	for	CCA.	CCA	needs	scientific	
innovation	in	order	to	understand	the	future	disaster	risk	and	to	make	the	appropriate	predictions.		
	
Communities	are	frequently	involved	in	the	management	of	a	range	of	cultures	and	identities	and	these	
cultures	and	identities	are	an	outcome	of	their	past	experience,	local	knowledge	and	cultural	memory.	
According	to	Gaillard	and	Mercer	(2013),	this	knowledge	has	an	impact	on	the	creation	of		scientific	
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knowledge.	 Accordingly,	 this	 local	 knowledge	 should	 be	 gained	 through	 participatory	 mapping	 by	
interacting	with	 local	and	scientific	stakeholders.	This	will	enable	the	 integration	of	 local	knowledge	
with	 scientific	 innovations	 (Gaillard	 and	 Mercer,	 2013;	 O’Brien	 et	 al.,	 2008).	 As	 such,	 traditional	
knowledge	gained	through	DRR	practices	should	be	linked	to		scientific	knowledge,	but	currently,	this	
need	for	integration	has	not	been	recognised	by	both	DRR	and	CCA	communities	(Gero	et	al.,	2011;	
Venton	and	Trobe,	2008;	Xu	and	Grumbine,	2014).	
	
Furthermore,	the	importance	of	integrating	local	knowledge	with		national	decision-making	has	been	
well	recognized	and	therefore,	national	action	plans	for	climate	change	adaptation	should	incorporate	
the	knowledge	of	scientific	theory	as	well	as	knowledge	gained	from	the	communities	(O'Brien	et	al.,	
2006;	Xu	and	Grumbine,	2014).	From	the	academic	perspective,	CCA	is	often	considered	as	a	subset	of	
DRR,	and	DRR	is	considered	as	a	subset	of	development	(DasGupta	and	Shaw,	2017).	Despite	this,	CCA	
and	DRR	have	not	been	integrated	at	national	and	international	levels	due	to	political	and	governance	
reasons.	At	the	international	level,	parallel	platforms	exist	to	manage	DRR	and	CCA	which	are	governed	
by	 parallel	 frameworks.	 To	 achieve	 a	 more	 inclusive	 DRR,	 including	 CCA,	 and	 integrating	 with	
development	 goals,	 requires	 co-production	 and	 sharing	 of	 knowledge	 (Cadag,	 2017).	 The	 use	 of	
participatory	approaches,	while	engaging	all	 actors	 including	 the	most	marginalized	communities	 in		
society,	will	 be	 a	 powerful	mechanism	 to	 recognize	 the	 different	 issues	 surrounding	 CCA,	DRR	 and	
development	(Cadag,	2017).		
	
Another	key	challenge	 for	 scientific	 innovation	 is	 the	mismatch	between	CCA	and	DRR	approaches.		
Birkmann	 and	 von	 Teichman	 (2010)	 describe	mismatches	 under	 three	 subheadings	 namely:	 spatial	
scale	mismatches,	temporal	scale	mismatches	and	functional	scale	mismatches.	Spatial	scale		refers	to	
the	context	where	CCA	and	DRR	measures	are	applied.	Accordingly,	 it	has	been	 identified	 that	CCA	
issues	are	primarily	analysed	on	a	global	scale	whereas	DRR	measures	are	applied	 in	 the	respective	
regions	and	 localities.	Further,	 climate	scientists	have	mostly	designed	global	models	and	predicted	
global	 trends,	 striving	 for	 universal	 laws,	 whereas	 the	 DRR	 community	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 local	
vulnerabilities	and	risks	of	specific	areas,	hazards	and	groups	of	people	potentially,	or	actually,	affected	
(Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010).		
	
In	terms	of	temporal	scale	mismatches,	it	has	been	revealed	that	DRR	measures	and	funding	schemes	
are	available	only	 for	 the	short-term	aftermath	of	disasters	 instead	of	having	 long-term	sustainable	
disaster	measures	and	funding	schemes.	 In	contrast,	CCA	strategies	require	 long-term	commitment,	
which	goes	far	beyond	a	political	election	period.	Accordingly,	CCA	and	DRR	communities	tend	to	work	
separately	as	the	scales	are	mismatched	in	terms	of	the	scope	and	funding	availability	in	both	disciplines	
(Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010).		
	
Thirdly,	 functional	scale	mismatch	can	also	be	 identified	as	a	key	 issue	for	successful	 integration.	 In	
most	 countries,	 climate	 change	 issues	 have	 been	 tackled	 by	 the	 environment	 ministries	 and	
meteorological	services,	whereas	disaster	risk	management	often	lies	within	the	responsibility	of	the	
ministry	 of	 the	 interior,	 defence	 or	 development.	 Existing	 funding	 schemes,	 which	 are	 structured	
according	to	the	objectives	of	the	issuing	institution,	do	not	allow	for	the	integration	of	measures	that	
are	inconsistent	with	its	respective	scope	of	responsibility;		clear	evidence	of	this	incoherent	search	for	
solutions.	Differences	in	their	respective	mandates,	programmes	and	sets	of	measures	on	how	to	deal	
with	climate	change	issues	on	the	one	hand,	and	DRR	on	the	other	hand,	create	great	difficulties	when	
developing	a	coherent	and	integrative	strategy	(Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010;	Djalante,	2012).		
	
Mismatched	knowledge	is	also	a	key	gap	in	integrating	CCA	and	DRR.	This	is	the	knowledge	required	to	
take	 decisions	 under	 conditions	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 possible	 surprise	 (Birkmann	and	 von	 Teichman,	
2010;	EFDRR,	2013).	In	an	uncertain	environment,	both	CCA	and	DRR	communities	should	be	properly	
aware	of	 their	 knowledge	bases	 and	boundaries	 and	how	 that	 knowledge	 can	be	used	 in	decision-
making.	However,	currently,	both	CCA	and	DRR	communities	have	not	identified	the	boundaries	of	their	
knowledge	bases.	As	a	 result,	 the	CCA	and	DRR	communities	are	 in	 	 real	 competition	 in	generating	
knowledge	for	CCA	and	DRR	(Rivera,	2014;	EFDRR,	2013).	This	competitive	knowledge	gaining	process	
between	the	CCA	and	DRR	communities	has	hindered	straightforward	communication,	collaboration	
and	joint	programming	across	larger	governance	networks	(Birkmann	and	von	Teichman,	2010;	EFDRR,	
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2013).	For	example,	socio-economic	data	on	vulnerable	communities	derived	from	DRR	initiatives	 is	
not	communicated	to	CCA	communities	and	therefore,	vulnerability	assessments	become	difficult	and	
accordingly,	proper	adaptation	strategies	are	not	correctly	in		place	(EFDRR,	2013).	On	the	other	hand,	
Anderson	 (2012)	 states	 technical	 experts	 do	 not	 accommodate	 local	 knowledge	 derived	 from	DRR	
initiatives	in	their	climate	change	adaptation	strategies	due	to	the	inability	of	assessing	such	knowledge.		
	
Furthermore,	it	is	essential	to	understand	both	CCA	and	DRR	alongside	the	Sustainable	Development	
Goals,	as	many	of	the	targets		overlap	(DasGupta	and	Shaw,	2017).	As	such,	in	reality	it	is	exceptionally	
challenging	to	segregate	issues	of	climate	change	and	DRR,	as	communities	do	not	feel	the	impact	of	
natural	 hazards	 and	 climate	 change	 separately.	 This	 requires	 practitioners	 and	 policy	 makers	 to	
consider	both	the	issues	coherently	(DasGupta	and	Shaw,	2017).	According	to	Velasquez	(2017),	despite	
target	11.b	of	SDGs	calling	for	integration	in	planning,	there	is	still	a	lot	of	confusion	among	CCA	and	
DRR	professionals	about	what	it	means	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR	into	development.		However,	some	
countries	have	already	taken	steps	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR	into	development.	For		example,	in	India,	
while	recognizing	the	increasing	risks,	the	Government	has	made	intensive	efforts	for	CCA	and	DRR	and	
to	integrate	DRR	into	development	(Copde	et	al.,	2016).		
	
Another	key	issue	hindering	scientific	innovations	is	the	segregation	of	global	frameworks	for	CCA	and	
DRR.	 There	 are	 separate	 global	 and	 regional	 frameworks	 available	 for	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 (Sperling	 and		
Szekely,	 2005;	 UNISDR	 and	 UNDP,	 2012).	 For	 example,	 Sperling	 and	 Szekely	 (2005)	 identify	 two	
separate	frameworks	available	for	CCA	and	DRR	in	the	Pacific	region.	As	a	result,	integration	of	the	two	
concepts	 is	 not	 generally	 accepted	 and	 hence,	 operate	 separately	 (Gero	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Different	
institutions,	 coming	 from	 different	 organisational	 cultures,	 manage	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 and	 that	
organisational	culture	influences	the	generation		of	separate	agendas	and	frameworks.	These		different	
cultures	hinder	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	(Forino	et	al.,	2015).		
	
Similarly,	in	Central	America,	separate	laws	exist	for	management	of	DRR	and	CCA.	For		example,	the	
Nicaraguan	Government	passed	Law	337,	which	created	the	National	System	for	Disaster	Management	
and	Prevention	-		the	governmental	body	in	charge	of	co-ordinating	all	DRR	actions	in	the	country	-	and	
the	National	Strategy	on	climate	change	which	is	managed	by	the	Ministry	of	Environment	and	Natural	
Resources	 for	 CCA	 (Rivera,	 2014).	 A	 study	 conducted	 by	 Rivera	 (2014)	 revealed	 the	 importance	 of	
creating	co-ordinated	actions	between	CCA	and	DRR	which	would	avoid	the	duplication	of	effort	and	
ensure	better	use	of	human	and	financial	resources.		
	
	
	
4.4 Challenges	and	Gaps	related	to	trans-boundary	Crisis	
Management	
This	 section	 reviews	 the	 challenges/gaps	 associated	with	 trans-boundary	 crisis	management	 in	 the	
context	of	the	existing	legal/policy	situation.	
	
In	recent	years,	an	increasing	number	of	devastating	trans-boundary	threats	were	witnessed	around	
the	globe	(Ansell	et	al.,	2010;	Boin	and	Rhinard,	2008;	Olsson,	2015).	A	trans-boundary	threat	is	where	
there	is	a	potential	to	cross	geographical	and	functional	boundaries	(Boin	and	Rhinard,	2008).	Thus,	it	
demands	 a	 joint	 response	 which	 requires	 actors	 at	 various	 administrative	 and	 geographical	 levels	
(Olsson,	2015).	As	such,	according	to	Ansell	et	al.	(2010),	it	creates	an	interdependence	among	actors	
involved,	requires	extreme	adaptation	and	unprecedented	co-operation	as	the	response	is	distributed	
across	multiple	organizations	 and	 jurisdictions.	However,	 according	 to	Olsson	 (2015),	 establishing	a	
network	for	trans-boundary	crisis	management	is	challenged	by	ambiguity,	complexity	and	uncertainty	
in	terms	of	responsibility,	co-operation	and	mandates.		
	
In	 October	 2015,	 the	 Nansen	 Initiative	 presented	 the	 agenda	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 cross-border	
displaced	 persons	 in	 the	 context	 of	 disasters	 and	 climate	 change	 which	 was	 endorsed	 by	 109	
governments	(Mc	Adam,	2016);	one	 	good	example	of	a	trans-boundary	 initiative.	Furthermore,	the	
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Sendai	 Framework	 calls	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 trans-boundary	 co-operation	 to	 build	 resilience	 and	
disaster	risks	(Mc	Adam,	2016).	 It	guides	actions	at	national	and	local	 levels,	as	well	as	regional	and	
international	 levels,	 to	 foster	 more	 efficient	 planning,	 create	 common	 information	 systems	 and	
exchange	good	practice	and	programmes	for	co-operation	and	capacity	development,	in	particular,	to	
address	 common	 and	 trans-boundary	 disaster	 risks.	 	 As	 such,	 the	 framework	 recognises	 the	 trans-
boundary	nature	of	disaster	risk	and	guides	action	at	the	regional	level	through	agreed	regional	and	
subregional	 strategies	 and	 mechanisms	 for	 co-operation.	 Similarly,	 the	 Paris	 Agreement	 brings	 all	
nations	into	a	common	cause	to	combat	climate	change	and	adapt	to	its	effects,	with	enhanced	support	
to	 assist	 developing	 countries	 (UNFCCC,	 2015).	 The	 Agreement	 recognises	 adaptation	 as	 a	 global	
challenge	 with	 local,	 subnational,	 national,	 regional	 and	 international	 dimensions,	 and	 a	 special	
emphasis	 has	 been	 given	 to	 enhancing	 the	 capacities	 of	 developing	 countries	 to	 implement	 this,	
including	through	regional,	bilateral	and	multilateral	approaches.	Likewise,	the	SDGs	have	a	dedicated	
goal	 on	 revitalising	 global	 partnerships	 for	 sustainable	 development	 which	 recognises	 the	 trans-
boundary	nature	of	the	problem	and	the	importance	of	trans-boundary	co-operation.		
	
According	to	Hart	and	Tindall	 (no	date),	“Trans-boundary	crisis	management	demands	that	multiple	
actors	in	distinct	jurisdictions,	in	coherent	ways,	jointly	handle	the	shared	crisis	and	aftershocks.”	Thus,	
it	is	necessary	to	create	tight	collaborations	with	network	partners,	not	only	during	the	crisis,	but	also	
at	the	pre-crisis	stage	(Bakker	et	al.,	2016).	Among	others,	crisis	leadership	is	of	paramount	importance	
to	balance	information	and	expert	recommendations	with	other,	equally	important	perspectives	(Hart	
and	Tindall,	no	date).	Further,	Ansell	et	al.	(2010)	argued	that	the	response	to	a	trans-boundary	crisis	
requires	a	specific	set	of	organizational	and	procedural	tools	and,	according	to	Boin	and	Rhinard	(2008),	
the	institutional	challenge	is	a	key	barrier	to	build	effective	trans-boundary	systems	for	managing	the	
complex	threats.	
	
Most	of	the	trans-boundary	crises	 in	Africa	are	 less	political	 in	nature	and	more	clan	based	or	tribal	
conflict	based	crises,	which,	in	turn,	are	determined	by	the	conflict	over	natural	resources.	Rulers,	or	
the	administrators	of	the	political	boundaries,	have	very	little	control	over	the	clans	which	often	clash,	
resulting		in	a	trans-boundary	crisis.	Political	actions	are	therefore	hampered	by		clan	based	conflicts,	
which	are	mostly	autonomous	or	independent	of	the	political	parties.		
	
Africa	has	one	of	the	most	structured,	 inter-governmental	organisations	called	the	African	Union.	 In	
addition	to	the	African	Union	and	to	ensure	trans-boundary	co-operation,	particularly	across	borders,	
there	 is	 an	 institutional	 mechanism	 called	 Regional	 Economic	 Communities.	 Regional	 Economic	
Communities	is	duly	recognised	by	the	United	Nations	and	the	African	Union.	They	play	a	key	role	in	
ensuring	that	there	is	political	action	for	trans-boundary	risk	and	crisis	management.	All	the	countries	
in	Africa	are	members	of	 the	African	Union	and	Regional	Economic	Communities.	However,	 lack	of	
capacity	with	 the	 inter-governmental	organisations	 to	 influence	 their	national	 counterparts	 is	a	key	
challenge.	The	East	African	Community	Disaster	Risk	Reduction	and	Management	Act	of	2013	is	a	very	
good	example	that	inter-governmental	organisations	have	adopted,	with	acceptance	by	the	member	
states	of	that	inter-governmental	organisation,	a	document	which	focuses	mostly	on	trans-boundary	
crises	as	well	as	risk	management.	Similar	policies	also	exist	in	Central	Africa	and	in	West	Africa	and	the	
Southern	African	community	has	also	recently	adopted	a	preparedness	strategy	with	all	the	member	
states	of	the	Southern	African	Developmental	Community	in	Southern	Africa.	So,	these	are	some	of	the	
key	policy	documents,		some	of	which	have		legal	backing	to	ensure	trans-boundary	management.	
	
In	addition,	there	are	many	inter-governmental	mechanisms	where	most	of	the	member	states	or	the	
nation	states	participate	and	cross-exchange	their	information,	ideas,	approaches	and	experiences.	For	
example,	one	of	the	respondents	stated,	“We	have	just	organised	a	regional	Pan-Africa	platform	on	
disaster	 risk	 reduction	 in	Mauritius,	 47	 African	 countries	 participated.	 So	 that	 gives	 a,	 kind	 of,	 an	
opportunity	for	the	countries	to	cross-exchange	and	share	their	experience.”	Figure	27	summarises	the	
key	findings	of	the	African	region.	
	
 
 
 
 39	
 
Figure	27-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	trans-boundary	crisis	management	–	Africa	
Trans-boundary	 issues	 are	 not	 much	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 Australia	 and	 Canada.	 One	 of	 the	
respondents	associated	with		Australia	stated,	“We	are	an	island	so	we	don’t	have	a	trans-boundary	
problem.	 I	 mean	 we	 could	 have	 issues	 between	 states,	 but	 we	 really	 don’t	 have	 trans-boundary	
problems	as	such	as	it	would	happen	in	Europe	or	US.”	
 
In	 terms	 of	 America,	 the	 present	 administration	 leans	 more	 towards	 a	 nationalist	 approach	 and	
therefore,	 one	 of	 the	 respondents	 stated,	 “Issues	 of	 a	 transnational	 kind	 of	 collaboration	 and	 co-
operation	are	in	jeopardy	I	would	argue.”	However,	scientific	and	professional	networks	carry	out	a	lot	
of	trans-boundary	work	although	there	are	no	legal	requirements	to	do	so.	As	a	country,	the	USA	has	
historically	been	heavily	engaged	in	humanitarian	aid	outside	the	country	and	will	engage	in	that	kind	
of	humanitarian	effort.	Figure	28	summarises	the	key	findings	of	the	American	region.	
	
	
Figure	28-	Challenges	and	gaps	related	to	trans-boundary	crisis	management	–	America	
4.5 Challenges	and	Gaps	related	to	Risk		
This	section	critically	reviews	the	risk	perception	and	its	associated	challenges/gaps	in	the	context	of	
the	existing	legal/policy	situation.		
	
Lack	of	awareness	of	climate	risk	is	a	major	challenge	in	most		climate	change	adaptation	mechanisms	
(O'Brien,	2006	#270).	Since	CCA	strategies	focus	on	future	risks	(Mitchell	and	van	Aalst,	2008;	Venton	
and	Trobe,	2008),	risk	assessment	is	considered	a	vital	part	in	adaptation	strategies	(Thomalla	et	al.,	
2006).	However,	due	to	the	uncertain	nature	of	climate	change,	policy	makers	adopt	a	‘wait	and	see’	
approach	to	most	of	the	climate	change	incidents	(Sperling	and	Szekely,	2005).	This	uncertainty	limits	
the	weighting	of	future	risks	and	hence,	it	hinders	the	incorporation	of	adaptation	strategies	with	risk	
reduction	 strategies	 (Conway	and	Schipper,	 2011).	 In	 addition,	high	 levels	of	uncertainty	 in	 climate	
projections	disturb	their	understanding	of	the	future	risks	and	actions	necessary	for	managing	climate	
change	(Conway	and	Schipper,	2011).	This	is	further	complicated	by	the	limited	availability	of	tools	and	
techniques	for	CCA	when	compared	to	the	full	range	of	well-established	tools	for	DRR	(Mitchell	and	van	
Aalst,	 2008).	 A	 study	 conducted	 in	 the	 Pacific	 Islands	 also	 revealed	 that	 proper	 climate	 data	 and	
modelling	affect	the	adaptation	response.	According	to	them,	this	is	a	major	concern	in	integrating	CCA	
with	 DRR	 (Hay,	 2009).	 Also,	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 technical	 capacity	 to	 understand	 the	 limits	 and	
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uncertainties	related	to	climate	data	used	for	models	and	scenario	development	which	reduces	the	
accuracy	of	risk	assessment	and	thereby,		impacts	effective	adaptive	planning	(Kato,	2010	#520).		
	
In	 terms	of	 the	perception	of	 risk,	 it	was	evident	 that	 there	are	many	differences	between	the	two	
communities,	CCA	and	DRR.	The	DRR	community	works	on	all	kinds	of	hazards.	The	CCA	community	
sees	themselves	relevant	only	to	climate	related	hazards.	For		example,	earthquake	is	a	considerable	
hazard	for	most		countries,	and	the	DRR	community	sees	earthquakes	as	part	of	risk	but	it	is	not	part	
of	 the	 agenda	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 community.	 Further,	 the	 communities	 who	 deal	 with	 DRR,	
sometimes	have	to	tackle	broader	issues	beyond	natural	hazards,	for	example,	pandemics,	terrorism	
or	 security	 issues.	As	 such,	 it	 is	 a	 far	 larger	domain	and	one	of	 the	 respondents	 stated,	 “That's	 the	
reason	that	the	CCA	communities	are,	kind	of,	focused	on,	specific	hazards	like	floods,	landslides,	wet	
landslides,	typhoons,	cyclones	and	heat	waves.”	Furthermore,	when	looking	at	the	origin	of	the	two	
phenomena,	the	DRR	community's	origin	is	 in	humanitarian	issues	and	disasters	which	have	already	
happened,	 and	 the	 climate	 change	 community	 is	 largely	 engaged	 in	 the	 scientific	 theories	 and		
projections.	While	the	DRR	community	talks	largely	about	existing	risks,	the	climate	change	community	
is	more	futuristic	and	they	like	to	see	into	the	future:	what	new	risks	might	come	up	in	the	future	based	
on	long-term	projections.		
	
Moreover,	one	of	the	interviewees	stated,	“Disaster	risk	community	talks	more	about	the	short-term	
actions,	which	is	usually	not	beyond	five	to	ten	years,	the	climate	change	community	talks	up	to	50	to	
100	 years.”	 As	 such,	 it	 was	 evident	 that	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 differences	 as	 to	 how	 the	 two	
communities	perceive	risk	in	their	disciplines.	However,	the	global	frameworks,	for	example,	the	Sendai	
Framework,	 has	 tried	 to	 bring	 these	 two	 perceptions	 together,	 or	 at	 least,	 closer.	 The	 Sendai	
Framework	has	introduced	a	term	on	new	risks,	or	the	prevention	of	new	risks,	which	is	actually		much	
closer	 to	 the	climate	change	dimension	of	 risk	because	 it	makes	the	DRR	community	become	more	
futuristic.	
	
In	terms	of	risk	assessment,	one	of	the	key	challenges	faced	by	both	CCA	and	DRR	communities	is	the	
monitoring	of	disasters.	The	monitoring	data	has	not	been	there	for	a	historical	period	of	time	and	as	a	
result,	CCA	and	DRR	communities	have	less		data	which	results	in	poor	projections.	As	such,	a	lack	of	
information	 has	 been	 a	 key	 barrier,	 especially	 for	 regions	 such	 as	 Africa.	 The	 community	 based	
information,	which	is	a	very	important	set	of	information	for	implementation,	is	also	very	limited	and	
there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 connection	 between	 the	 information	 available	 at	 the	 national	 level	 and	 at	 the	
community	level.	Accordingly,	one	of	the	respondents	stated,	“I	think	the	most	important	requirement	
for	doing	any	kind	of	risk	assessment	is	the	data	needs,	and	that	in	itself	is	a	big	challenge.”	Agreeing	
with	this,	another	respondent,	representing	the	Asian	region,	stated,	“The	biggest	challenge	is	that	we	
really	 do	 not	 keep	 systematic	 data	 in	 the	 country.	 Now,	 data	 is	 not	 only	 by	 the	 meteorological	
department	 or	 disaster	 relief,	 each	 of	 the	ministries	 -	 they	 really	 don’t	 have	 the	 procedure.	 They	
generate	 a	 lot	 of	 data	 but	 they	 don’t	 really	 keep	 that	 information	 from	 an	 angle	 that	 will	 help	
understand	which	kind	of	risks	they	are	going	to	have.”	Another	important	issue	is	information	sharing.	
For	example,	some	of	the	ministries	and	institutions	have	done	several	studies	but		those	studies	are	
not	available	in	public	domains.	Furthermore,	a	lot	of	information	on	climate	and	climatic	models	are	
done	but	those	are	still	at	the	research	level	and	not	available	for	district	planning,		community	planning	
or	local	planning	processes.		
	
5 Quantitative	Analysis	and	Findings	
5.1 Institutional	Arrangements		
Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 survey,	 barriers	 associated	 with	 existing	 institutional	 arrangements	 in	
dealing	with	DRR	and	CCA	were	ranked	based	on	the	Relative	Importance	Index	(RII).	As	shown	in	Table	
1,	‘poor	communication	between	organisations’	is	ranked	as	the	key	barrier	in	dealing	with	DRR	while	
‘unclear	 roles	and	responsibilities’	 is	 ranked	as	 the	key	barrier	 in	dealing	with	CCA.	Among	the	pre-
identified	barriers,	‘lack	of	qualified	staff’	is	ranked	last	in	both	categories.	As	shown	in	Table	1,	a	large	
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majority	of	 the	respondents	either	 ‘agreed’	or	 ‘strongly	agreed’	with	the	 institutional	barriers	 listed	
within	the	questionnaire.	50.71%	of	participants	strongly	agreed	that	poor	communication	between	
organisations	is	a	barrier	when	dealing	with	DRR.	Within	the	domain	of	the	DRR,	the	second	key	barrier	
was	reported	as	‘unclear	roles	and	responsibilities’	where	a	large	majority	of	the	respondents,	89.44%,	
agreed	or	strongly	agreed.	In	addition	to	what	has	been	listed,	respondents	also	noted	that	insufficient	
time	to	concentrate	on	DRR	was	a	barrier,	as	staff	are	often	busy	with	too	many	other	priorities.	Among	
others,	 lack	of	 funding	 to	 the	 local	 institutions,	 lack	of	 authorities,	poor	 knowledge	and	knowledge	
management	systems,	lack	of	political	will	and	access	to	data		also	emerged	as	barriers.	
	
In	terms	of	CCA,	a	large	majority	of	the	respondents,	82.01%,	agreed	or	strongly	agreed	that	unclear	
roles	and	responsibilities	are	a	barrier.	The	second	key	barrier	was	reported	as	‘poor	communication	
between	organisations’	where	a	large	majority	of	the	respondents,	81.43%,	agreed	or	strongly	agreed.	
In	addition	to	what	has	been	listed,	lack	of	institutional	will,	lack	of	political	will	and	disregard	of	local	
adaptation	strategies	also	emerged	as	barriers.	
	
Table	1	:	Barriers	in	existing	institutional	arrangements		
1Total	percentage	of	‘agree’	and	‘strongly	agree’	
	
Survey	results	were	then	analysed	based	on	the	regions	and	ranked	based	on	the	RII	(Table	2	and	Table	
3).	 In	 terms	of	DRR,	 ‘poor	 communication	between	organisations’	was	 ranked	as	 the	key	barrier	 in	
Europe,	America	and	Asia	while	divergent	governance	structures	and	unclear	roles	and	responsibilities	
were	ranked	as	key	barriers	in	Oceania.	In	contrast,	the	most	prevailing	barrier	in	Africa	was	‘lack	of	
stakeholder	 participation’.	 CCA	 results	 somewhat	 differ	 with	 DRR	 results	 except	 for	 the	 Asian	 and	
African	regions	where	‘poor	communication	between	organisations’	was	the	key	barrier	in	Asia	while	
‘lack	of	stakeholder	participation’	was	the	key	barrier	in	Africa.	Similar	to	Africa,	‘lack	of	stakeholder	
participation’	is	ranked	as	the	primary	barrier	in	Oceania.	In	contrast,	‘divergent	governance	structures’	
was	ranked	as	the	key	barrier	in	America	while	‘unclear	roles	and	responsibilities’	was	ranked	as	the	
key	barrier	in	Europe.	
	
Respondents	also	emphasised	that	it	is	difficult	to	agree	on	common	barriers	at	the	EU	level	since	the	
economic	 situation	 varies	 largely	 over	 the	 continent.	 The	 same	may	 apply	 with	 other	 regions,	 for		
example,	 the	 Asian	 region	 includes	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 countries	 with	 varied	 political	 and	 economic	
conditions. 
 
	 DRR	 CCA	
Factors	 RII	 Rank	 Modal	
Opinion	
Combined	
Majority1	
RII	 Rank	 Modal	
Opinion	
Combined	
Majority1	
Poor	
communication	
between	
organisations	
0.8671	 1	 Strongly	
agree	
(50.71%)	
86.43%	 0.8300	 2	 Agree	
(42.14%)	
81.43%	
Unclear	roles	and	
responsibilities	
0.8366	 2	 Agree	
(52.82%)	
89.44%	 0.8345	 1	 Strongly	
agree	
(41.73%)	
82.01%	
Poor	data	
management	
systems	
0.8269	 3	 Agree	
(45.39%)	
83.69%	 0.8100	 5	 Strongly	
agree	
(39.29%)	
75.00%	
Divergent	
governance	
structures	
0.8056	 4	 Agree	
(52.11%)	
83.10%	 0.8158	 3	 Agree	
(47.48%)	
80.55%	
Lack	of	stakeholder	
participation	
0.7690	 5	 Agree	
(52.82%)	
74.65%	 0.8129	 4	 Agree	
(43.88%)	
77.70%	
Lack	of	qualified	
staff	
0.7396	 6	 Agree	
(46.76%)	
66.91%	 0.7435	 6	 Agree	
(38.41%)	
64.49%	
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Table	2	:	Barriers	in	existing	institutional	arrangements	when	dealing	with	DRR	-	RII	score	
Factors	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	
Divergent	governance	structures	 0.78919	 2	 0.81026	 4	 0.88000	 1	 0.74286	 6	 0.77500	 5	
Unclear	roles	and	responsibilities	 0.76757	 3	 0.86154	 2	 0.88000	 1	 0.85714	 3	 0.82500	 3	
Poor	communication	between	organisations	 0.84444	 1	 0.87013	 1	 0.86000	 3	 0.82857	 5	 0.97500	 1	
Lack	of	stakeholder	participation	 0.72973	 5	 0.76923	 6	 0.80000	 5	 0.91429	 1	 0.80000	 4	
Poor	data	management	systems	 0.75135	 4	 0.85455	 3	 0.82000	 4	 0.88571	 2	 0.85000	 2	
Lack	of	qualified	staff	 0.64324	 6	 0.77632	 5	 0.74000	 6	 0.83333	 4	 0.75000	 6	
 
 
Table	3	:	Barriers	in	existing	institutional	arrangements	when	dealing	with	CCA	-	RII	score	
Factors	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	 RII	 Rank	
Divergent	governance	structures	 0.77778	 2	 0.82564	 4	 0.82000	 3	 0.80000	 6	 0.92500	 1	
Unclear	roles	and	responsibilities	 0.78857	 1	 0.85897	 2	 0.80000	 4	 0.85714	 2	 0.85000	 3	
Poor	communication	between	organisations	 0.75000	 4	 0.86923	 1	 0.80000	 4	 0.82857	 4	 0.87500	 2	
Lack	of	stakeholder	participation	 0.77714	 3	 0.81538	 5	 0.88000	 1	 0.91429	 1	 0.80000	 5	
Poor	data	management	systems	 0.73333	 5	 0.83590	 3	 0.86000	 2	 0.82857	 4	 0.85000	 3	
Lack	of	qualified	staff	 0.61714	 6	 0.78442	 6	 0.76000	 6	 0.85714	 2	 0.80000	 5	
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After	 analysing	 the	 institutional	 barriers	 for	 DRR	 and	 CCA,	 respondents	 were	 asked	 to	 rank	 the	
institutional	barriers	 in	 integrating	DRR	and	CCA.	Survey	results	are	summarised	 in	Table	4	with	the	
order	of	importance.	As	shown	in	Table	4,	‘lack	of	political	will’	ranked	as	the	most	prevailing	barrier	
for	integration.	It	was	also	evident	that	existing	legal	frameworks	and	policies	do	not	fully	support	the	
integration	and,	as	a	result,	it	was	ranked	as	the	second	most	important	barrier.	Thirdly,	it	was	evident	
that	separate	funding	sources		exist	for	DRR	and	CCA	and	this	too	has	been	widely	mentioned	within	
the	survey	as	a	barrier	for	integrating	DRR	and	CCA.	In	addition	to	what	was	listed	in		Table	4,	lack	of	
co-ordination	 between	 government	 institutions	 and	 lack	 of	 data	 availability	were	 also	 identified	 as	
barriers	for	integrating	DRR	and	CCA.		
 
Table	4	:	Barriers	in	existing	institutional	arrangements	when	integrating	DRR	and	CCA	
Institutional	barriers	for	integrating	
DRR	and	CCA	
Total	Count	 Rank	 Mean	
Lack	of	political	will	 99	 1	 39.34%	
Legal	frameworks	and	policies	 106	 2	 18.87%	
Separate	funding	sources	and	
allocations	
102	 3	 16.67%	
Institutions	are	not	ready	 91	 3	 14.29%	
Unclear	roles	and	responsibilities	 103	 4	 22.33%	
Divergent	governance	structures	 107	 5	 15.89%	
Poor	communication	between	
organisations	
112	 6	 16.96%	
Lack	of	stakeholder	participation	 110	 8	 15.46%	
Poor	data	management	systems	 110	 9	 20.91%	
Lack	of	qualified	staff	 125	 10	 22.40%	
 
Results	were	also	analysed	regionally	and	the	‘lack	of	political	will’	was	ranked	as	the	key	barrier	in	all	
five	regions:	Europe,	Asia,	Oceania,	Africa	and	America.		
5.2 Funding	Arrangements		
In	 terms	of	 funding	arrangements,	 it	was	evident	 that	 the	highest	component	of	 funding	 for	DRR	 is	
coming	 from	 national/central	 governments	 followed	 by	 international	 grants.	 For	 CCA,	 the	 highest	
components	of	funding	are	coming	from	international	grants,	followed	by	donor	funding	(international)	
and	regional	grants.	In	addition	to	what	is	listed	in		Table	5,	respondents	also	highlighted	other	funding	
sources	 such	 as	 crowd-source	 funding.	 It	 was	 also	 evident	 that,	 for	 DRR,	 it	 is	 mostly	 the	
continuation/extension	 of	 funding	 allocations	 from	 the	 emergency	 response	 period	 and	 very	 little	
funding	is	available	purely	for	DRR	without	an	initial	disaster.	
	
Table	5	:	Funding	available	for	DRR	and	CCA	initiatives	
	 DRR	 CCA	
Funding	sources	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	grants	 75	 16.24	 70	 19.39	
EU	or	regional	grants		 59	 12.77	 60	 16.62	
Donor	funding	(international)		 66	 14.29	 61	 16.90	
Donor	funding	(national)		 50	 10.82	 35	 9.70	
National/central	government		 90	 19.48	 55	 15.24	
Local	government		 54	 11.69	 27	 7.48	
Private	sector	 33	 7.14	 24	 6.65	
Public	private	partnerships		 35	 7.58	 29	 8.03	
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When	analysing	the	regional	results,	it	was	evident	that	DRR	funding	for	Europe	is	mainly	coming	from	
EU	or	regional	grants	followed	by	international	grants	and	national/central	government.	CCA	funding	
is	mainly	coming	from	EU	or	regional	grants	followed	by	international	grants.	It	was	also	noted	that	the	
national/central	 government	 funding	 for	 CCA	 is	 comparatively	 low	 compared	 to	 DRR.	 In	 Asia	 and	
America,	the	main	funding	source	for	DRR	is	national/central	government	funding.	Many	respondents	
have	also	voted	for	donor	funding	(international)	and	international	grants.	CCA	funding	for	Asia	mainly	
comes	from	donor	funding	(international)	and	international	grants	while	national/central	government	
funding	 was	 ranked	 first	 in	 America.	 In	 Oceania,	 more	 respondents	 voted	 for	 the	 accessibility	 of	
national/central	 government	 funding	 and	 national	 donor	 funding	 for	 DRR	 and	 national/central	
government	funding	and	international	grants	for	CCA.	African	results	were	somewhat	different	to	other	
regions	and	many	 respondents	have	not	 identified	national/central	 government	 funding	as	a	major	
funding	source	for	both	DRR	and	CCA.	The	funding	mainly	comes	from	international	grants,	regional	
grants	and	donor	funding	(international)	for	both	DRR	and	CCA.	The	results	are	depicted	in	Table	6	and	
Table	7.	
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Table	6	:	Funding	available	for	DRR	initiatives	
Funding	sources	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	grants	 19	 17.92	 46	 15.65	 4	 12.50	 3	 21.43	 3	 18.75	
EU	or	regional	grants		 23	 21.70	 28	 9.52	 3	 9.38	 4	 28.57	 1	 6.25	
Donor	funding	(international)		 10	 9.43	 48	 16.33	 4	 12.50	 3	 21.43	 1	 6.25	
Donor	funding	(national)		 11	 10.38	 31	 10.54	 6	 18.75	 0	 -	 2	 12.5	
National/central	government		 19	 17.92	 58	 19.73	 6	 18.75	 2	 14.29	 5	 31.25	
Local	government		 11	 10.38	 35	 11.90	 5	 15.63	 1	 7.14	 2	 12.5	
Private	sector	 6	 5.66	 23	 7.82	 2	 6.25	 1	 7.14	 1	 6.25	
Public	private	partnerships	 7	 6.60	 25	 8.50	 2	 6.25	 0	 21.43	 1	 6.25	
 
 
Table	7	:	Funding	available	for	CCA	initiatives	
Funding	sources	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	grants	 17	 18.68	 43	 20.77	 5	 16.67	 2	 15.38	 3	 15.00	
EU	or	regional	grants		 19	 20.88	 31	 14.98	 4	 13.33	 4	 30.77	 2	 10.00	
Donor	funding	(international)		 11	 12.09	 40	 19.32	 4	 13.33	 4	 30.77	 2	 10.00	
Donor	funding	(national)		 8	 8.79	 20	 9.66	 3	 10.00	 2	 15.38	 2	 10.00	
National/central	government		 11	 12.09	 35	 16.91	 5	 16.67	 0	 -	 4	 20.00	
Local	government		 10	 10.99	 12	 5.80	 3	 10.00	 0	 -	 2	 10.00	
Private	sector	 5	 5.49	 13	 6.28	 3	 10.00	 1	 7.69	 2	 10.00	
Public	private	partnerships	 10	 10.99	 13	 6.28	 3	 10.00	 0	 -	 3	 15.00	
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5.3 Stakeholder	Integration	
Based	on	the	survey	results,	key	stakeholders	involved	in	DRR	and	CCA	were	identified.	It	was	evident	
that	all	stakeholders	listed	in	Table	8,	are	engaged	in	DRR	and	CCA	initiatives	at	various	levels.	National/	
central	government	and	ministries,	 international	organisations,	regional	organisations	and	academia	
and	 research	 	 emerged	 as	 the	 highest	 engaged	 stakeholders	 for	 both	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 while	 low	
engagement	 was	 observed	 from	 private	 sector	 and	 charitable	 organisations.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
stakeholders	listed	in	Table	8,	some	respondents	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	the	media.		
 
Table	8	:	Stakeholders	involved	in	DRR	and	CCA	initiatives	
	 DRR	 CCA	
Stakeholders	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	organisations	 85	 10.28	 77	 11.61	
Regional	organisations	 76	 9.19	 70	 10.56	
National/central	government	and	
ministries	 91	 11.00	 80	 12.07	
Local	governments	 81	 9.79	 54	 8.14	
International	NGOs	 73	 8.83	 66	 9.95	
NGOs	 72	 8.71	 60	 9.05	
Private	sector	 52	 6.29	 43	 6.49	
Community	based	organisations	 75	 9.07	 49	 7.39	
Charitable	organisations	 59	 7.13	 36	 5.43	
Community	 72	 8.71	 42	 6.33	
Academia	and	research	 91	 11.00	 86	 12.97	
 
When	 analysing	 the	 regional	 results	 for	 DRR,	 it	 was	 evident	 that	 the	 engagement	 of	 international	
organisations	in	Asia	and	Oceania	is	somewhat	lower	than	that	of	other	regions.	On	the	other	hand,	
participation	of	 regional	 organisations	 is	 comparatively	higher	 in	Africa	 compared	 to	other	 regions.	
Furthermore,	involvement	of	national/central	government	is	comparatively	higher	in	all	regions	except	
for	America.	Further,	national	and	international	NGO	presence	is	comparatively	low	in	Oceania	and	the	
participation	of	the	private	sector	is	comparatively	low	in	all	regions.	Charitable	organisations	are	also	
somewhat	low	in	Europe	and	Asia.	Regional	results	of	DRR	are	summarized	in	Table	9.	
	
When	analyzing	the	regional	results	of	CCA,	participation	of	international	organisations	in	America	and	
Asia	is	somewhat	lower	than	the	other	regions.	Similar	to	DRR,	Africa	has	more	presence	of	regional	
organisations	 than	 other	 regions.	 Involvement	 of	 local	 government	 in	 CCA	 is	 somewhat	 low	 in	 all	
regions	 compared	with	 DRR	 and	 the	 involvement	 of	 private	 sector,	 community,	 community	 based	
organisations	 and	 charitable	 organisations	 is	 comparatively	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 other	 stakeholders.	
Regional	results	of	CCA	are	summarized	in	Table	10.	
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Table	9	:	Stakeholders	involved	in	DRR	initiatives	
Stakeholders	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	organisations	 21	 11.48	 48	 9.84	 4	 7.84	 4	 11.43	 6	 12.50	
Regional	organisations	 17	 9.29	 45	 9.22	 5	 9.80	 4	 11.43	 3	 6.25	
National/central	government	and	
ministries	 21	 11.48	 54	 11.07	 6	 11.76	 4	 11.43	 4	 8.33	
Local	governments	 16	 8.74	 49	 10.04	 6	 11.76	 3	 8.57	 5	 10.42	
International	NGOs	 17	 9.29	 44	 9.02	 2	 3.92	 4	 11.43	 4	 8.33	
NGOs	 14	 7.65	 45	 9.22	 3	 5.88	 4	 11.43	 4	 8.33	
Private	sector	 12	 6.56	 33	 6.76	 2	 3.92	 1	 2.86	 2	 4.17	
Community	based	organisations	 15	 8.20	 44	 9.02	 6	 11.76	 2	 5.71	 6	 12.50	
Charitable	organisations	 10	 5.46	 33	 6.76	 6	 11.76	 3	 8.57	 5	 10.42	
Community	 17	 9.29	 40	 8.20	 6	 11.76	 3	 8.57	 4	 8.33	
Academia	and	research	 23	 12.57	 53	 10.86	 5	 9.80	 3	 8.57	 5	 10.42	
 
Table	10	:	Stakeholders	involved	in	CCA	initiatives	
Stakeholders	 Europe	 Asia	 Oceania	 Africa	 America	
	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	 Count	 %	
International	organisations	 22	 13.02	 40	 10.90	 6	 13.95	 4	 15.38	 4	 10.00	
Regional	organisations	 18	 10.65	 39	 10.63	 4	 9.30	 4	 15.38	 3	 7.50	
National/central	government	
and	ministries	 21	 12.43	 45	 12.26	 5	 11.63	 3	 11.54	 4	 10.00	
Local	governments	 16	 9.47	 31	 8.45	 2	 4.65	 2	 7.69	 2	 5.00	
International	NGOs	 16	 9.47	 37	 10.08	 4	 9.30	 3	 11.54	 4	 10.00	
NGOs	 15	 8.88	 34	 9.26	 2	 4.65	 2	 7.69	 5	 12.50	
Private	sector	 11	 6.51	 23	 6.27	 4	 9.30	 1	 3.85	 2	 5.00	
Community	based	organisations	 10	 5.92	 28	 7.63	 4	 9.30	 1	 3.85	 4	 10.00	
Charitable	organisations	 6	 3.55	 21	 5.72	 3	 6.98	 2	 7.69	 3	 7.50	
Community	 10	 5.92	 24	 6.54	 3	 6.98	 1	 3.85	 3	 7.50	
Academia	and	research	 24	 14.20	 45	 12.26	 6	 13.95	 3	 11.54	 6	 15.00	
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After	analysing	 the	 stakeholder	participation	 for	DRR	and	CCA,	 respondents	were	asked	 to	 rank	 the	barriers	 for	
stakeholder	participation.	Survey	results	are	summarised	in	Table	11	with	the	order	of	importance	(modal	rank).	As	
shown	in	Table	11,	‘lack	of	interest’	and	‘lack	of	political	will’	ranked	as	the	most	prevailing	barriers	for	both	DRR	
and	CCA.	It	was	also	evident	that	‘lack	of	funding’	is	the	next	most	important	barrier	for	DRR	and	‘legal	frameworks	
and	policies’	for	CCA.	Also	‘competing	priorities’	ranked	5th	for	DRR	and	11th	for	CCA.		
	
Table	11	:	Barriers	for	stakeholder	participation	-		DRR		
Barriers	for	stakeholder	
participation	
DRR	 CCA	
	 Total	
Count	
Modal	
Rank	
Mean	 Total	
Count	
Modal	
Rank	
Mean	
Lack	of	interest		 70	 1	 15.71	 64	 1	 23.08	
Lack	of	political	will		 73	 1	 24.66	 73	 1	 21.92	
Lack	of	funding		 73	 2	 17.82	 67	 4	 23.88	
Lack	of	stakeholder	engagement		 73	 4	 20.55	 72	 6	 15.28	
Competing	priorities		 91	 5	 16.05	 76	 11	 14.47	
Legal	frameworks	and	policies		 72	 5	 15.28	 73	 3	 20.55	
Divergent	governance	structures		 78	 6	 15.38	 66	 5/6	 18.18	
Unclear	roles	and	responsibilities		 78	 7	 16.67	 74	 5	 17.57	
Poor	communication	between	
organisations	
78	 8	 20.51	 72	 7/8	 18.06	
Lack	of	qualified	staff		 86	 9	 16.28	 74	 8	 21.62	
Lack	of	opportunities	to	
participate	
77	 9/10	 19.48	 74	 9	 18.92	
	
When	analyzing	the	regional	results	of	DRR,	‘lack	of	interest’,	‘lack	of	stakeholder	engagement’	and	‘lack	of	political	
will’	emerged	as	the	key	barriers	in	Europe	while	it	was	‘lack	of	political	will’	and	‘lack	of	funding’	in	America.	‘Lack	
of	political	will’	also	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	for	stakeholder	participation	in	Asia.	In	contrast,	‘lack	of	interest’	
and	‘competing	priorities’	were	the	key	barriers	for	Africa	while	‘lack	of	funding’,	‘legal	frameworks	and	policies’	and	
‘competing	priorities’		emerged	as	the	key	barriers	for	Oceania.		
	
CCA	results	were	somewhat	similar	to	DRR	results.	‘Lack	of	interest’	and	‘lack	of	political	will’	emerged	as	the	key	
barriers	 for	 Europe	 and	 Asia	 while	 ‘lack	 of	 interest’,	 ‘lack	 of	 political	 will’,	 ‘lack	 of	 qualified	 staff’	 and	 ‘lack	 of	
opportunities	 to	 participate’	 emerged	 as	 key	 barriers	 in	 America.	 ‘Lack	 of	 interest’	 and	 ‘competing	 priorities’	
emerged	as	the	key	barriers	for	Oceania.	Similar	to	DRR,	‘lack	of	interest’	and	‘competing	priorities’	were	the	key	
barriers	for	Africa.		
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5.4 Barriers	for	integrating	DRR	and	CCA	Initiatives	
Based	on	the	results	of	the	survey,	barriers	for	integrating	DRR	and	CCA	initiatives	were	ranked	based	on	the	RII.	As	
shown	 in	 Table	 12,	 ‘poor	 communication	 between	 organisations’	 emerged	 as	 the	 key	 barrier	 with	 a	 combined	
majority	of	84.94%	while	 ‘unclear	roles	and	responsibilities’	emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier	with	a	combined	
majority	of	83.52%.	 ‘Competition	between	DRR	and	CCA	communities’	was	ranked	as	the	 least	dominant	barrier	
with	an	RII	of	0.672340	and	a	combined	majority	of	51.06%.	As	shown	in	Table	12,	the	majority	of	the	respondents	
agreed	with	the	barriers	for	integration	listed	within	the	questionnaire.	As	such,	it	was	evident	that	all	of	the	barriers	
listed	within	the	questionnaire	are	in	existence	at	varying	degrees	in	various	regions	across	the	globe.	
	
	
Table	12	:	Barriers	for	integrating	DRR	and	CCA	initiatives	
Factors	 Total	
Count	
RII	 Rank	 Modal	Opinion	 Combined	
Majority1	
Poor	communication	between	
organisations	
93	 0.832258	 1	 Agree	(49.46%)	 84.94%	
Unclear	roles	and	responsibilities	 91	 0.815385	 2	 Agree	(50.54%)	 83.52%	
Different	perceptions	on	risk	 93	 0.808602	 3	 Agree	(46.23%)	 79.57%	
Lack	of	political	will	 93	 0.804301	 4	 Agree	(51.61%)	 80.65%	
Institutional	arrangements	 93	 0.797849	 5	 Agree	(52.69%)	 78.49%	
Separate	funding	sources	and	
allocations	
90	 0.793333	 6	 Agree	(52.22%)	 78.89%	
Poor	data	management	systems	 93	 0.791398	 7	 Agree	(47.31%)	 77.42%	
Lack	of	dissemination	of	best	practices	 93	 0.769892	 8	 Agree	(45.61%)	 70.97%	
Divergent	governance	structures	 92	 0.767391	 9	 Agree	(46.74%)	 70.65%	
Inadequate	cooperation	among	DRR	
and	CCA	communities	
94	 0.765957	 10	 Agree	(55.32%)	 77.67%	
Legal	frameworks	and	policies	 92	 0.754348	 11	 Agree	(44.57%)	 69.56%	
Lack	of	stakeholder	participation	 92	 0.747826	 12	 Agree	(48.91%)	 68.48%	
Functional	mismatches	 93	 0.731183	 13	 Agree	(52.69%)	 68.82%	
Temporal	mismatches	 90	 0.715556	 14	 Agree	(45.56%)	 61.11%	
Spatial	mismatches	 92	 0.713043	 15	 Agree	(42.39%)	 60.87%	
Competition	between	DRR	and	CCA	
communities	
94	 0.672340	 16	 Agree	(31.91%)	 51.06%	
1Total	percentage	of	‘agree’	and	‘strongly	agree’	
	
When	looking	at	the	regional	results,	‘different	perceptions	of	risk’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	in	Europe	with	an	RII	
of	 0.833333	while	 ‘separate	 funding	 sources	 and	 allocations’	 emerged	 as	 the	 second	 key	 barrier	with	 an	 RII	 of	
0.808696.	Modal	opinion	for	all	barriers		emerged	as	‘agreed’	except	for	‘different	perceptions	of	risk’	where	the	
modal	barrier	was	‘strongly	agreed’	and	‘lack	of	dissemination	of	best	practices’,	where	the	modal	barrier	emerged	
as	‘neither	agreed	nor	disagreed’.	
	
When	looking	at	the	results	of	the	American	region,	‘lack	of	political	will’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	
0.96	while	 ‘poor	 communication	between	organisations’	emerged	as	 the	 second	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.92.	
Modal	opinion	for	all	barriers		emerged	as	‘agreed’	or	‘strongly	agreed’	except	for	‘temporal	mismatches’,	where	
the	modal	barrier	was	‘neither	agreed	nor	disagreed’.	
	
The	Asian	region	showed	somewhat	similar	results	to	the	American	region,	where	‘poor	communication	between	
organisations’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.864286	while	‘unclear	roles	and	responsibilities’	emerged	
as	the	second	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.855556.	Modal	opinion	for	all	barriers		emerged	as	‘agree’.	Similar	results	
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were	observed	 in	 the	African	 region	where	 ‘poor	communication	between	organisations’	and	 ‘unclear	 roles	and	
responsibilities’	with	an	RII	of	0.866667	emerged	as	key	barriers.	
	
In	contrast,	‘legal	frameworks	and	policies’	and	‘divergent	governance	structures’	ranked	as	key	barriers	in	Oceania	
with	an	RII	of	0.9.	Furthermore,	modal	opinion	for	‘spatial	mismatches’	emerged	as	‘disagree’	and	the	modal	opinion	
for	‘lack	of	dissemination	of	best	practices’	emerged	as	‘neither	agreed	nor	disagreed’.	The	majority	of	respondents	
either	agreed	or	strongly	agreed	with	the	rest	of	the	barriers.		
	
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that,	 depending	 on	 each	 country’s	 or	 locality’s	 availability	 and	 quality	 of	 scientific	
communities/experts	and	bureaucrats,	the	DRR	and	CCA	integration	may	vary.	In	supporting	this	argument,	one	of	
the	 respondents	 stated,	 “This	 is	 a	 very	 challenging	 process	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	
considerable	difference	in	their	popularity:	where	I	am,	CCA	is	hip,	especially	amongst	the	young,	and	DRR	is	largely	
ignored.”	
	
In	 addition	 to	 what	 was	 ranked	 within	 the	 survey,	 respondents	 have	 also	 highlighted	 several	 other	 barriers.	
Accordingly,		the	importance	of	conceptualizing	the	risk,	risk	assessment	and	risk	management	became	clear:		crucial	
in	DRR	and	CCA	projects.	When	integrating,	it	is	also	important	that	DRR	and	CCA	policy	making	and	research	are		
integrated.	In	general,	the	objectives	of	DRR	are	defined	in	legal	frameworks.	However,	CCA	initiatives	are	defined	
more	 in	 terms	 of	 strategies,	 which	 act	 as	 a	 barrier	 for	 integration.	 As	 such,	 the	 question	 is	 not	 whether	 the	
governance	 requires	 a	 coherent	 or	 divergent	 structure,	 but	 whether	 the	 necessary	 bonding	 and	 bridging	
mechanisms	are	present	to	make	integration	of	DRR	and	CCA	work	and	at	the	right	level	for	giving	meaningful	results.	
	
Some	of	the	respondents	also	highlighted	that	integration	requires	skilled	personnel	to	lead	the	way.	It	was	also	a	
challenge	to	define	which	aspects	of	DRR	and	CCA	require	integration	as	this	can	be	in	terms	of	risk	assessments,	
data	management	or	it	can	be	in	terms	of	policies.	Furthermore,	it	is	important	to	mainstream	DRR	and	CCA	into	
national	development	planning	and	policy,	without	which,		integration	will	not	happen.	CCA	and	DRR	should	start	
from	national	policy	as	well	as	among	regional	countries,	otherwise,	it	will	be	the	last	priority	for	the	government's	
budget	 allocation.	 International	 organizations,	 such	 as	 the	 UN,	 can	 also	 play	 a	 major	 role	 in	 this	 process	 by	
encouraging	and	stimulating	countries	to	set	up	a	fund	track	for	CCA,	DRR	and	relevant	research.	
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5.5 Barriers	for	trans-boundary	Crisis	Management	
Based	on	the	results	of	the	survey,	barriers	for	trans-boundary	crisis	management	were	ranked	based	on	the	RII.	As	
shown	 in	 Table	 13,	 ‘economic	 factors’	 emerged	 as	 the	 key	 barrier	 with	 a	 combined	 majority	 of	 82.42%	 while	
‘differential	 priorities	 among	 nations’	 emerged	 as	 the	 second	 key	 barrier	with	 a	 combined	majority	 of	 86.96%.	
‘language	 and	 communication	 barriers	 among	 nations’	was	 ranked	 as	 the	 least	 dominant	 barrier	with	 an	 RII	 of	
0.712088	and	a	combined	majority	of	62.64%.	As	shown	in	Table	13,	the	majority	of	the	respondents	‘agreed’	or	
‘strongly	agreed’	with	the	barriers	for	trans-boundary	crisis	management	listed	within	the	questionnaire.	As	such,	it	
was	evident	 that	all	of	 the	barriers	 listed	within	 the	questionnaire	are	 in	existence	at	varying	degrees	 in	various	
regions	across	the	globe.	
	
Table	13	:	Barriers	for	trans-boundary	crisis	management	
Factors	 Total	
Count	
RII	 Rank	 Modal	Opinion	 Combined	
Majority1	
Economic	factors	 91	 0.848352	 1	 Strongly	Agree	
(42.86%)	
82.42%	
Differential	priorities	among	nations	 92	 0.847826	 2	 Agree	(48.91%)	 86.96%	
Inadequate	legal	frameworks	and	
policies	on	transboundary	crisis	
management	
92	 0.832609	 3	 Agree	(43.48%)	 82.61%	
Lack	of	political	will	and	support	 93	 0.832258	 4	 Agree	(47.31%)	 83.87%	
Inadequate	legal	frameworks	and	
policies	on	transboundary	allocation	of	
funding	
91	 0.830769	 5	 Agree	(49.45%)	 84.62%	
Imbalanced	support	from	countries	 91	 0.826374	 6	 Agree	(42.86%)	 80.22%	
Procedural	difference	among	nations	in	
employing	professionals	in	neighbouring	
countries	
90	 0.822222	 7	 Agree	(46.67%)	 81.11%	
Lack	of	understanding	between	the	
nations	
93	 0.821505	 8	 Agree	(50.54%)	 82.80%	
Procedural	difference	among	nations	in	
DRR	and	CCA	priorities	
91	 0.813187	 9	 Agree	(45.05%)	 78.02%	
Spatial	mismatches	 90	 0.753333	 10	 Agree	(44.44%)	 64.44%	
Functional	mismatches	 87	 0.747126	 11	 Agree	(42.53%)	 62.07%	
Lack	of	dissemination	of	best	practices	
among	nations	
91	 0.745055	 12	 Agree	(39.56%)	 65.93%	
Temporal	mismatches	 89	 0.730337	 13	 Agree	(41.57%)	 59.55%	
Language	and	communication	barriers	
among	nations	
91	 0.712088	 14	 Agree	(39.56%)	 62.64%	
1Total	percentage	of	‘agree’	and	‘strongly	agree’	
	
When	 looking	 at	 the	 regional	 results,	 ‘inadequate	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 policies	 on	 trans-boundary	 crisis	
management’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	in	Europe	with	an	RII	of	0.816667	while	‘inadequate	legal	frameworks	and	
policies	on	trans-boundary	allocation	of	funding’	emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.816000.	Modal	
opinion	for	all	barriers	emerged	as	 ‘agreed’	except	for	 ‘economic	factors’	where	the	modal	barrier	was	 ‘strongly	
agreed’.	 Similar	 to	 Europe,	 ‘inadequate	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 policies	 on	 trans-boundary	 crisis	 management’	
emerged	as	the	key	barrier	in	Africa	with	an	RII	of	0.933333.	All	barriers	were	in	existence	in	Africa,	where	the	modal	
opinion	was	either	‘agreed’	or	‘strongly	agreed’	for	all	of	the	barriers.	
	
When	looking	at	the	results	of	the	American	region,	‘lack	of	political	will	and	support’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	
with	an	RII	of	0.96	while	‘economic	factors’	emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.92.	Modal	opinion	for	
all	barriers	emerged	as	 ‘agreed’	or	 ‘strongly	agreed’,	where	a	majority	of	 respondents	either	agreed	or	 strongly	
agreed	with	the	barriers	listed	within	the	questionnaire.		
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In	contrast,	‘differential	priorities	among	nations’	and	‘economic	factors’	ranked	as	key	barriers	in	Oceania	with	an	
RII	of	1.0	and	0.95	respectively.	Furthermore,	modal	opinion	for	most	of	the	barriers	emerged	as	‘strongly	agreed’	
while	the	modal	opinion	for	‘spatial,	functional	and	temporal	mismatches’	emerged	as	‘neither	agree	nor	disagree’.	
Similar	results	were	observed	within	the	Asian	region,	where	‘differential	priorities	among	nations’	and	‘economic	
factors’	ranked	as	key	barriers	in	Asia	with	an	RII	of	0.855556	and	0.851852	respectively.	The	modal	opinion	was	
‘agreed’	or	‘strongly	agreed’	and	it	was	evident	that	all	barriers	were	in	existence	in	Asia.		
	
In	addition	to	what	has	been	listed	within	the	questionnaire,	respondents	also	identified	that	absence,	or	lack	of	
joint-scenario	planning	for	trans-boundary	crisis	situations,	were	barriers	to	trans-boundary	crisis	management.	In	
many	cases,	disasters	and	the	climate	change	impacts	are	trans-boundary	in	nature.	As	such,	the	engagement	of	one	
country	will	not	solve	the	 issues	related	to	CCA	and	DRR.	So,	 it	 is	vital	 to	establish	such	collaboration	towards	a	
comprehensive	disaster	management	and	climate	change	adaptation.	The	AADMER	of	ASEAN	is	a	good	example	of	
a	 legally-binding,	 regional	 agreement,	 which	 can	 manage	 a	 trans-boundary	 crisis.	 However,	 most	 of	 the	
countries/regions	do	not	have	such	policies	and	frameworks	to	manage	trans-boundary	crises.		Therefore,	there	is	
a	need	to	identify	and	create	the	typology	of	trans-boundary	crises,	and	subsequently	find	the	appropriate	regional	
bodies	for	managing	those	crises.	The	regional	approach	is	essential	in	trans-boundary	crisis	management.	The	role	
of	regional	organisations	in	bringing	about	trans-boundary	co-operation	is	very	important	but	somehow,	there	is	
hardly	any	work	taking	place	on		this	front.	It	is	important	to	also	consider	the	alignment	of	trans-boundary	crisis	
management	 with	 other	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 in	 the	 humanitarian	 field.	 Respondents	 also	 highlighted	 the	
importance	of	continuous	interaction	in	trans-boundary	crisis	management,	not	limiting	this	to	‘one	off’	situations.	
5.6 Barriers	for	Scientific	Innovations	
Based	on	the	results	of	the	survey,	barriers	for	scientific	innovations	were	ranked	based	on	the	RII.	As	shown	in	Table	
14,	‘lack	of	interdisciplinary	approach’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	with	a	combined	majority	of	92.31%	while	‘lack	of	
integration	of	science	and	technology	with	DRR	and	CCA	legal	frameworks	and	policies’	emerged	as	the	second	key	
barrier	with	a	combined	majority	of	83.52%.	‘Competition	between	DRR	and	CCA	communities’	was	ranked	as	the	
least	dominant	barrier	with	an	RII	of	0.694505	and	a	combined	majority	of	51.65%.	As	shown	in	Table	14,	the	majority	
of	the	respondents	‘agreed’	with	the	barriers	for	scientific	innovations	listed	within	the	questionnaire.	As	such,	it	
was	evident	 that	all	of	 the	barriers	 listed	within	 the	questionnaire	are	 in	existence	at	varying	degrees	 in	various	
regions	across	the	globe.	
	
	
Table	14	:	Barriers	for	scientific	innovations	
Factors	 Total	
Count	
RII	 Rank	 Modal	Opinion	 Combined	
Majority1	
Lack	of	interdisciplinary	approach	 91	 0.859341	 1	 Agree	(51.65%)	 92.31%	
Lack	of	integration	of	science	and	
technology	with	DRR	and	CCA	legal	
frameworks	and	policies	
91	 0.817582	 2	 Agree	(52.75%)	 83.52%	
Different	perceptions	of	risk	 92	 0.813043	 3	 Agree	(51.09%)	 82.61%	
Lack	of	funding	opportunities	 92	 0.806522	 4	 Agree	(52.17%)	 81.52%	
Lack	of	dissemination	of	best	practices	 91	 0.797802	 5	 Agree	(56.04%)	 80.22%	
Lack	of	political	will	and	support	 94	 0.787234	 6	 Agree	(47.87%)	 74.47%	
Language	and	communication	barriers	
among	CCA	and	DRR	communities	in	
terms	of	concepts	and	terminology	
91	 0.775824	 7	 Agree	(49.45%)	 74.43%	
Language	and	communication	barriers	
among	practitioners	and	general	public	
91	 0.775824	 7	 Agree	(49.45%)	 75.82%	
Inadequate	cooperation	among	DRR	
and	CCA	communities	
91	 0.771429	 9	 Agree	(45.05%)	 71.43%	
Lack	of	stakeholder	participation	 92	 0.769565	 10	 Agree	(52.17%)	 75.00%	
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Language	and	communication	barriers	
among	academic	community	and	
practitioners	
91	 0.764835	 11	 Agree	(42.86%)	 72.53%	
Legal	frameworks	and	policies	 92	 0.754348	 12	 Agree	(42.39%)	 67.39%	
Spatial	mismatches	 89	 0.730337	 13	 Agree	(42.70%)	 60.67%	
Functional	mismatches	 90	 0.715556	 14	 Agree	(51.11%)	 61.11%	
Temporal	mismatches	 91	 0.709890	 15	 Agree	(46.15%)	 57.14%	
Competition	between	DRR	and	CCA	
communities	
91	 0.694505	 16	 Agree	(32.97%)	 51.65%	
1Total	percentage	of	‘agree’	and	‘strongly	agree’	
	
When	looking	at	the	regional	results,	‘lack	of	interdisciplinary	approach’	emerged	as	the	key	barrier	in	Europe	with	
an	RII	of	0.852174	while	‘language	and	communication	barriers	among	practitioners	and	general	public’	emerged	as	
the	 second	 key	 barrier	with	 an	 RII	 of	 0.843478.	Modal	 opinion	 for	 all	 barriers	 	 emerged	 as	 ‘agreed’	 except	 for	
‘language	and	communication	barriers	among	academic	community	and	practitioners’	where	the	modal	barrier	was	
‘strongly	agree’	and	‘competition	between	DRR	and	CCA	communities’	where	the	modal	barrier	was	‘neither	agree	
nor	disagree’.	Similar	to	Europe,	‘language	and	communication	barriers	among	practitioners	and	general	public’	and	
‘lack	of	interdisciplinary	approach’	emerged	as	the	key	barriers	in	Oceania	with	an	RII	of	0.90	and	0.85	respectively.	
‘Language	and	communication	barriers	among	academic	community	and	practitioners’	also	emerged	as	a	key	barrier	
in	Oceania	with	an	RII	of	0.85.	Similarly,	 ‘language	and	communication	barriers	among	practitioners	and	general	
public’	 and	 ‘lack	 of	 interdisciplinary	 approach’	 emerged	 as	 key	 barriers	 in	 Africa,	 in	 addition	 to	 ‘language	 and	
communication	barriers	among	CCA	and	DRR	communities	in	terms	of	concepts	and	terminology’,	all	of	which	scored	
an	RII	of	0.9333333.	The	majority	of	 the	respondents	either	 ‘agreed’	or	 ‘strongly	agreed’	with	the	barriers	 listed	
within	the	questionnaire	with	the	exception	of	one	barrier,	‘legal	frameworks	and	policies’,	where	the	majority	of	
the	respondents	disagreed.	As	such,	it	was	evident	that	the	legal	frameworks	and	policies	do	not	act	as	a	major	issue	
for	scientific	innovation	in	the	African	region.	
	
When	 looking	 at	 the	 results	 of	 the	 American	 region,	 ‘lack	 of	 funding	 opportunities’,	 ‘lack	 of	 interdisciplinary	
approach’	 and	 ‘lack	 of	 integration	 of	 science	 and	 technology	with	 DRR	 and	 CCA	 legal	 frameworks	 and	 policies’	
emerged	as	key	barriers	with	an	RII	of	0.92.	Modal	opinion	for	all	barriers		emerged	as	either	‘agreed’	or	‘strongly	
agreed’	 except	 for	 ‘spatial	 mismatches’,	 ‘temporal	 mismatches’	 and	 ‘competition	 between	 DRR	 and	 CCA	
communities’	where	a	majority	of	 respondents	 ‘nether	agreed	nor	disagreed’.	Similarly,	 ‘lack	of	 interdisciplinary	
approach’	 and	 ‘lack	 of	 funding	 opportunities’	 emerged	 as	 key	 barriers	 in	Asia	with	 RII	 scores	 of	 0.8545455	 and	
0.8357143	respectively.	The	majority	of	the	respondents	agreed	with	the	barriers	 listed	within	the	questionnaire	
and	the	modal	opinion	for	all	barriers	emerged	as	‘agreed’.		
 
In	addition	to	what	has	been	listed	within	the	questionnaire,	respondents	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	clearly	
defining	the	responsibilities	of	different	organizations	in	terms	of	scientific	innovations	and	having	a	scientific	basis	
for	all	DRR	and	CCA	projects.	Responders	also	emphasized	that	poor	communication	between	policy	makers	and	
researchers	acts	as	a	hindrance	for	scientific	innovations.	The	importance	of	integrating	science	and	technology	with	
legal	frameworks	and	policies	was	particularly	highlighted	and	it	is	science	and	technology	which	should	be	the	basis	
for	the	policy	development	in	future.	
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6 Conclusions		
Whether	 its	CCA	or	DRR,	 legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	play	a	key	role	 in	tackling	their	related	challenges.	
Accordingly,	this	report	reviews	the	existing	legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	globally.	It	identifies	the	available	
legal,	policy	and	science	approaches	that	address	climate	change	and	natural	hazards,	and	reviews	the	key	issues	
that	prevent	more	effective	integration.	The	key	data	collection	instruments	were	a	desk-based	literature	review,	
semi-	structured	expert	interviews	and	a	questionnaire	survey.	Key	findings	are	summarized	under	three	headings:	
integrating	CCA	and	DRR;	trans-boundary	crisis	management	and	scientific	innovations.  
6.1 Integrating	CCA	and	DRR	
It	 was	 evident	 that	 a	 number	 of	 barriers	 prevent	 integrating	 CCA	 and	 DRR.	 ‘Poor	 communication	 between	
organisations’	 emerged	as	 the	 key	barrier	 for	 integrating	CCA	and	DRR	while	 ‘unclear	 roles	 and	 responsibilities’	
emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier.	As	it	stands,	climate	change	policies	and	decisions	are	usually	made	by	ministries	
and	organizations	related	to	the	environment,	whereas	disaster	management	and	reduction	decisions	are	made	by	
ministries	 related	 to	 infrastructure	 development.	 Since	 CCA	 and	 DRR	 efforts	 are	 handled	 by	 two	 sets	 of	
organizations,	 their	 inherited	 cultures	 prevent	or	 reduce	effective	 integration.	Co-ordination	 challenges	 are	 also	
common	and	dialogue	between	the	CCA	and	the	DRR	community	is	not	necessarily	present	which	results	in	huge	
duplications.	Furthermore,	 there	are	different	 funding	systems	 for	CCA	and	DRR	at	global,	 regional	and	national	
levels,	 leading	to	policy	and	 institutional	separation.	 It	was	also	evident	that	there	 is	 limited	political	will	among	
those	in	the	disaster	management	and	environmental	communities	to	integrate	CCA	and	DRR	mandates.	One	reason	
for	 this	 is	 lack	of	understanding	of	 the	 importance	of	CCA,	DRR	and	their	 integration.	Furthermore,	some	of	 the	
political	 leaders	 assume	 that	 climate	 change	 is	 not	 an	 immediate	 disaster,	 and	 the	 political	 will	 is	 therefore	
sometimes	dependent	on	the	party	in	power.	Besides,	political	willingness	towards	CCA	and	DRR	in	some	countries	
depends	on	the	cost	of	the	actions.		As	most	of	the	issues	related	to	climate	change	and	risk	reduction	are	long-term	
issues,	unless	politicians	see	a	short-term	gain	from	it,	they	are	not	willing	to	invest.	
	
Moreover,	as	the	Paris	Agreement	is	a	global	agenda	agreed	by	the	heads	of	state,	it	has	become	legally	binding,	
whereas	the	Sendai	Framework	is	mainly	within	Disaster	Management	ministries	and	not	necessarily	legally	binding.	
Therefore,	CCA	has	received		state	level	attention	whereas	DRR	has	only		ministry	level	attention.	In	addition,	it	was	
evident	 that	 a	 large	number	of	 agreements	have	 created	 challenges,	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 implementation	and	
monitoring.	As	such,	how	the	policy	commitments	can	be	put	into	practice	has	become	less	straightforward.	
6.2 Trans-boundary	Crisis	Management	
Trans-boundary	 crisis	 creates	 an	 interdependence	 among	 actors	 involved	 as	 the	 response	 is	 distributed	 across	
multiple	organizations	and	jurisdictions.	As	such,	a	specific	set	of	organizational	and	procedural	tools	are	required	
to	better	manage	the	trans-boundary	crisis.	According	to	Olsson	(2015),	establishing	a	network	for	trans-boundary	
crisis	management	is	challenged	by	ambiguity,	complexity	and	uncertainty	in	terms	of	responsibility,	co-operation	
and	mandates.	Across	the	global	policies,	a	high	prominence	has	been	given	to	trans-boundary	co-operation	and	
crisis	management	and	the	post-2015	frameworks	calls	for	the	promotion	of	trans-boundary	co-operation	to	build	
resilience	 and	 climate	 change	 adaptation.	 Based	 on	 the	 results	 of	 the	 survey,	 barriers	 for	 trans-boundary	 crisis	
management	 were	 ranked	 based	 on	 the	 RII.	 ‘Economic	 factors’	 emerged	 as	 the	 key	 barrier	 while	 ‘differential	
priorities	among	nations’	emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier.	The	majority	of	the	respondents	‘agreed’	or	‘strongly	
agreed’	with	 the	barriers	 for	 trans-boundary	 crisis	management	 listed	within	 the	questionnaire.	As	 such,	 it	was	
evident	that	all	of	the	barriers	listed	within	the	questionnaire	are	in	existence	at	varying	degrees	in	various	regions	
across	the	globe.	
6.3 Scientific	Innovations	
It	was	evident	that	a	number	of	barriers	affect	scientific	innovations	in	CCA	and	DRR.	Based	on	the	results	of	the	
survey,	 barriers	 for	 scientific	 innovations	were	 ranked	 based	 on	 the	 RII	 and	 ‘lack	 of	 interdisciplinary	 approach’	
emerged	as	the	key	barrier	while	‘lack	of	integration	of	science	and	technology	with	DRR	and	CCA	legal	frameworks	
and	policies’	emerged	as	the	second	key	barrier.	At	the	international	level,	parallel	platforms	exist	to	manage	CCA	
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and	 DRR,	 governed	 by	 parallel	 frameworks.	 Therefore,	 to	 achieve	 a	 more	 inclusive	 DRR	 including	 CCA,	 and	
integrating	it	with	development	goals,	requires	co-production	and	sharing	of	knowledge.	
	
Furthermore,	based	on	the	literature	review	and	semi-structured	interviews,	it	was	evident	that	one	of	the	key	gaps	
for	the	integration	of	CCA	and	DRR	is	the	unrecognised	link	between	community	initiatives	and	scientific	knowledge.	
Traditional/indigenous	 knowledge	 at	 the	 community	 level	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 DRR	 whereas	 traditional/indigenous	
knowledge	is	insufficient	for	CCA.	CCA	needs	scientific	innovation	in	order	to	understand	the	future	disaster	risk	and	
to	make	 the	 appropriate	 predictions.	 Accordingly,	 this	 local	 knowledge	 should	 be	 gained	 through	 participatory	
mapping	by	interacting	with	local	and	scientific	stakeholders.	This	will	enable	the	integration	of	local	knowledge	and	
scientific	innovations.  
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